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Many studies like the IPC Rapid Social Impact Assessment (SIA)1 have been done after Ondoy (Ketsana) and 
Pepeng (Parma) devastated many vulnerable communities in Metro Manila and Northern Luzon in September-
October 2009. Two years later, the IPC Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM) study allows us a glimpse of how 
the urban and rural poor households have survived the hazards posed by storms, typhoons, floods and other 
climate change-related effects. 
 
Conducted in 21 communities in Metro Manila and Luzon, the study provides very rich and highly textured 
data regarding the socio-economic and political conditions of urban and rural poor communities. It also 
provides us a glimpse of the various paths that they have pursued over the past two years from disaster to 
recovery. The report gives insightful assessments of the short- and long-term impacts of the disaster and the 
implementation and effectiveness of the disaster response programs of both government and civil society 
organizations (CSOs). It enriches our spirit with narratives about how the poor tried to deal with their trauma 
and fears amid limited institutional aid/support, their attempts in recovering their losses and their hopes for 
building a better future. It weaves a rich tapestry of the stories of the men, women, and children their 
psychological responses and household coping mechanisms for livelihood and survival after the onslaughts of 
Ondoy/Pepeng. 
 
The findings and insights of this study can be very useful for LGUs and CSOs formulating and/or refining 
their local disaster risk reduction management plans and programs. These plans and programs will refine 
further reconstruction efforts in both urban and rural areas and possibly, the development of a more effective 
urban renewal strategy. In constructing effective management plans and programs, local officials and leaders 
need to construct vulnerability and capacity profiles of their constituents. They need to identify, among 
others, 1) the ecological, socio-economic and political locations of the poor, 2) the level of vulnerability of 
their economic activities and livelihood bases to climate change-related hazards/risks, and 3) the socio-
political and cultural adaptation patterns devised by the poor in response to disasters. 
 
Finally, this study serves as another milestone in IPC‘s institutional journey as a knowledge producer and 
broker to support the efforts of NGOs/POs, government agencies and multilateral agencies in crafting 
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1 This became part of the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) prepared by the Government of the Philippines in partnership with the World 
Bank, UN agencies, other international development partners and representatives of the private sector and civil society organizations. 
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1. Executive Summary 
 
The Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM) study provides an overview of the long term social 
impacts of typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng, which hit the Philippines in 2009. It builds on the initial 
analysis of the social impacts on affected communities carried out in the immediate aftermath of the 
disasters. Data was collected in a total of 21 sites in four cities in Metro Manila and nine provinces in 
Luzon. In addition to the qualitative analysis carried out in 19 sites (nine urban and ten rural areas), a 
short survey was conducted in two additional communities (Eusebio Bliss and Southville 5A). This 
enabled the research team to collect information on the living conditions of communities resettled post 
Ondoy/Pepeng. The data obtained enabled the team to compare the outcomes of ―in-city‖ (Eusebio 
Bliss) and ―off-city‖ (Southville 5A) resettlement.  
Ensuring that research questions and recommendations feed into policy discussions on 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management as well as on the Metro Manila Urban Renewal 
agenda was an important part of the SIM exercise. A SIM Reference Group comprised of 
representatives from government agencies, civil society groups and development partners working on the 
issues outlined above was convened. The group‘s inputs were instrumental in: (i) validating and finalizing 
research questions, and (ii) assessing the relevance and feasibility of the study‘s recommendations 
presented in the final section of this report.  
The SIM collected information on the following themes: (i) livelihoods and socio-economic 
impacts; (ii) social relations and cohesion, and (iii) resettlement options and housing conditions. Particular 
attention was also paid by the research team to understanding coping strategies taken by affected 
households, which often included a growing reliance on credit.  
Livelihoods 
Communities targeted by the study reported an overall reduction in income since 2009. 
Sources of income and the types of jobs available have remained the same before and after 
Ondoy/Pepeng in all of the sites visited. While sources of income were more diversified in urban areas, 
reductions in income in both rural and urban areas were attributed to the loss of assets and capital caused 
by the disasters. Wage workers (primarily in urban areas) were the only ―occupational category‖ whom 
respondents considered as having fully recovered from the losses caused by the typhoons. For the 
remainder (farmers, fishermen, small business owners and informal sector workers), the disaster had long 
term impacts. The overall trend observed across research sites had been for available capital to be 
diverted away from livelihood activities to meet more urgent housing reconstruction or basic 
consumption needs. Affected households, therefore, tended to shift to less capital intensive, less secure 
and less profitable occupations. This pattern was observed in rural areas: “ [Ma‟am, my observation is before 
Ondoy, most of the people in the neighborhood had farms and planted sayote,  but after the typhoon, they lost their farms 
and were forced to work in others people‟s farms]”, as well as urban areas: “[Now they have to work as mere vendors, 
selling in town stuff they didn‟t make, or work in construction sites. In the past we had our own capital, our own materials; 
now even capital we don‟t have].” 
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Livelihood assistance was provided to the vast majority of the communities covered in the 
study. Within the 20 month period that followed Ondoy and Pepeng, 18 of the 21 areas visited had 
received some form of financial assistance.  The primary sources of support mentioned by the 
respondents were: (i) existing social protection and livelihoods programs implemented by the 
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), (ii) Cash or Food for Work implemented by 
local governments in partnership with international development partners, and (iii) emergency grants or 
loans (ranging between Php 2,000 and Php 8,000) made available to the most severely affected 
households by local governments and civil society organizations.  
With the exception of two areas visited, all of the communities considered that the support 
they received  did not respond to their long-term livelihood recovery needs. The most frequently 
mentioned factor behind the inability to resume a profitable livelihood activity was the lack of 
capital. The research team systematically observed that funds set aside for livelihood activities were 
diverted to cover basic household needs: (i) basic consumption, (ii) medical expenses, and (iii) urgent 
housing repairs. Participants in the study also highlighted the importance of ensuring that livelihood 
training programs implemented are relevant to their context and local markets. In particular, communities 
pointed out that the training provided did not, in the majority of cases, lead to employment or better 
livelihood opportunities. 
Coping strategies 
The most commonly adopted coping strategies were consistent with the trends observed in 
2009 and remained: (i) taking on additional or temporary jobs where available; (ii) reducing 
consumption, and (iii) taking on multiple loans, including for basic expenditures. Income was found to be 
very uncertain, requiring households to be highly opportunistic in pursuing livelihood opportunities. In 
spite of the multiple jobs held by household members, however, income remained in most cases 
insufficient to cover basic consumption needs.  
Reducing the number of meals and the quality of the food consumed was observed in all 
urban sites, without exception. Significantly, only half of rural communities explicitly referred to 
reduced food in-take as a coping strategy. Close ties with neighbors and the ability to grow food for 
home consumption were the main reasons put forward by respondents to explain these patterns. As 
observed in 2009, children continued to go to school without an allowance to purchase food. The 
household budget could often not cover both the cost of transportation and of food. While removing 
children from school was seen as a last resort, the number of sites where households reported they could 
no longer afford schooling expenses increased from 2009 to 2011, as did the instances of children 
working. 
Access to credit and levels of debt 
Financial support from relatives continued to be rare in line with the research‟s team 2009 
findings. The practice of borrowing from multiple sources seems to have intensified in all 
research areas.  Overall, sources of credit have remained the same with only slight variations across 
rural and urban areas. While Micro-Finance Institutions were marginally more prevalent in urban areas, 
informal lenders were more frequently mentioned as sources of loans in rural areas. In addition, no 
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significant changes were noted in lending terms. In 17 of the sites visited, interest rates have remained the 
same for both formal and informal lending sources.  
While credit continued to be available, respondents systematically reported that their level of 
indebtedness had increased. Reports of at least some households with unpaid debts were found across 
all 19 sites. Significant delays in making payments were noted in over half of the areas visited. In addition, 
the inability to repay outstanding debt led to the loss of assets in urban and rural areas. While the practice 
of borrowing from multiple sources (“puhunan”) was a coping mechanism pre-dating the 2009 disasters, 
respondents indicated that the practice had intensified. It was reported in more than half of the sites 
visited: “ Usually, those who borrow, do not borrow just from one source. If you borrow Php 2,000 from one source, Php 
5,000 from the other, sometimes they all just add up and with the problem of not being able to borrow…because what you 
earn is not enough” […] “While this has long been the practice, it is more aggressive today. In fact, many take this option 
now.” 
Social relations and cohesion 
The general perception of communities consulted during the SIM was that the gender 
division of labor had returned to its pre-Ondoy situation. The SIM further indicated that households 
were increasingly reliant on the income generate by small businesses and temporary work, primarily 
undertaken by women. The research team found a clear concentration of women in a more restricted 
number of occupations. These were also typically lower paid jobs and less skilled jobs. Women were also 
more commonly drawn to home-based activities that would enable them to continue performing 
domestic tasks.  The research team encountered isolated instances where the disaster response seemed to 
encourage greater engagement by women in community activities. 
The research team encountered a widespread sense in targeted communities that youth were 
making significant contributions to the recovery effort. Young people contributed more to 
household budgets by taking on temporary work. This was accompanied by a change in communities‘ 
perception of the role of young people, now considered more trustworthy. This perception did not, 
however, translate into greater voice for youth in decision-making at the household or the community 
level. 
The analysis conducted in 2009 indicated that collaborative behavior was widespread among 
affected communities. Overall, instances of community-level recovery activities were rarer 
during the SIM. Informants systematically reported that after the initial rehabilitation efforts, 
community members provided support almost exclusively to their extended family. These close-knit 
networks were important in providing information about recovery programs and sources of support. 
They replaced the broader community as the main focus of collaborative behavior. Where instances of 
community-wide support mechanisms were observed, informants reported they had already been strong 
prior to the disasters. This was primarily observed in rural and peri-urban areas.  
Increased tensions within the community and greater levels of insecurity were observed in a 
reduced number of sites, mostly urban.  Overall, relationships within villages and urban 
neighborhoods remained positive. In communities with a significant number of new settlers there was a 
tendency to attribute law and order problems to ―new-comers‖, informal settlers or neighboring 
communities. Where an increase in crime and violence was noted, respondents indicated links to the 
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difficult post-disaster economic situation. Respondents considered that youth were the group at greater 
risk. 
Resettlement options and housing conditions 
Reports from communities on the provision of housing assistance were mixed. In kind and 
cash assistance had been provided to all significantly affected sites. However, participants systematically 
reported that assistance had not been sufficient to meet the needs of all affected households within these 
communities. Respondents also highlighted the delays between the initial needs assessment and the 
provision of assistance: “ Here people went from house to house and checked the damage of the house and the capacity of 
the owner to repair it. But they just did interviews. I saw no help coming in here in our place. We just thought we probably 
didn‟t qualify but if you look [you will see that] the houses of our neighbors were totally wrecked. But nothing […] they 
took photos and then nothing […] A year has passed and then nothing. Until it was my neighbors themselves who took 
care of the repairs. Because they couldn‟t wait anymore.” 
Residents in two study sites, Botolan in Zambales and Tublay in Benguet, remained in 
temporary shelter two years after they were moved from their homes. Feedback from residents 
revealed how living conditions and access to services had deteriorated over time in these areas. Residents 
attributed their stalled recovery to difficulties in securing a suitable resettlement site and to slow progress 
with the needed construction work for new developments. 
The qualitative research module indicated that communities in 12 study sites were reluctant 
to resettle in areas outside their barangay. The main reason for this was the risk of not being able to 
find a suitable livelihood in the resettlement areas. Fears of losing their current social support 
mechanisms were also critical, followed by concerns about access to services in resettlement areas and 
about risks in proposed resettlement areas.  
The short surveys conducted in Southville 5A (off-city resettlement area), and Eusebio Bliss 
(in-city resettlement) enabled the research team to compare living conditions and gain a sense of 
the impact of these two approaches on the welfare of resettled households.  Overall, respondents 
from both areas reported an improvement in living conditions: (i) better housing, (ii) improved access to 
safe sanitation, electricity, and garbage disposal. Access to piped water constituted a significant exception 
and was considerably lower for resettled households in both sites. Access to livelihoods remained a 
challenge for resettled households. Negative impacts were, however, stronger in the off-city resettlement 
area (Southville 5A), where two out of three households reported a decrease in income. Those resettled 
off-city also experienced increased expenditures, particularly in transport costs to get to jobs and to 
school.  
In addition, there were certain social costs associated with resettlement. Household living 
arrangements changed significantly for those resettled off-city. While the vast majority of households 
lived together prior to resettlement (93%), only 63% did so after resettlement in Southville 5A. In 
contrast no such changes were observed for those resettled in-city (Eusebio Bliss). Resettlement has also 
had an impact on households´ ability to ask for assistance from informal networks. Again, the impact was 
strongest for households resettled off-city, with a third of households in Southville 5A reporting 
difficulties in finding assistance for their daily needs.  
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Data collected through the SIM (from both the qualitative and quantitative modules) 
indicated that information regarding resettlement was inadequate or unavailable during the 
relocation and resettlement of affected households.  A significant proportion of those resettled did 
not have access to critical information on: (i) the location of the resettlement site, and (ii) on the cost of 
housing and payment schemes. Given the lack of information about the resettlement process, it was, 
therefore, significant that a large proportion of households attributed their decision to relocate primarily 
to the local government unit. 
A still significant proportion of households in both Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss were 
considering leaving their current place of residence (26% in Southville 5A and 39% in Eusebio 
Bliss). For those resettled off-city the main reason put forward was the limited access to employment. 
For households resettled in-city, the main concern was the difficulties in making payments on their 
housing units.  
Local governance and recovery 
Communities systematically highlighted the role played by the Municipal Social Welfare 
Development Officer (MSWDO) during both the relief and recovery phases. Being able to rely on 
community-based organizations and local leaders was essential for the implementation of recovery 
activities. Sites where respondents were satisfied with the distribution of recovery assistance tended to 
have put in place targeting systems that involved barangay and municipal city officers in collaboration 
with civil society or community-based organizations. 
In nine of the study sites visited, respondents said that the system put in place for the 
provision of recovery assistance had led to inequitable outcomes. In these areas, participants 
indicated that certain sub-groups in the community had been excluded. The communities believed that 
most of these gaps in the provision of assistance were not politically motivated. The research team did, 
however, find a number of instances where the grant of recovery assistance was highly personalized (i.e. 
direct cash or in kind assistance given by local government officials). 
Lack of information both about the targeting process and about the existing sources of 
assistance were consistently observed. Respondents often considered that differences in access to 
information partly explained the uneven distribution of support. Communities also highlighted a 
―monopoly of knowledge‖ by community leaders. 
Barangay and community level disaster preparedness measures need further strengthening. 
The research team noted uneven progress with the roll-out of the Municipal and Barangay Disaster Risk 
Reduction and Management Councils. While the research team observed greater awareness of the disaster 
risks in targeted areas, there were few community-based disaster prevention initiatives in place. These 
were observed in four of the sites visited and had limited linkages to wider city or municipal level 
activities. 
Recommendations from communities 
One of the key findings from the discussions with communities was that the livelihood 
support provided was often unsustainable. The availability of capital was the key ―missing element‖ 
in recovery according to respondents.  
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Respondents highlighted the need to improve communication among sub-groups within 
their communities. A number of suggestions were put forward, primarily from urban areas, of activities 
that could promote greater civic engagement and improve security within targeted neighborhoods. 
Except for the higher amortization rates, communities considered in-city resettlement as the 
best option to: (i) enable households to retain access to livelihood and employment opportunities; (ii) 
minimize disruptions to essential social support networks. Where ―in-city‖ resettlement was not a viable 
option, communities highlighted the importance of: (i) ensuring that basic services are available in new 
development sites, and (ii) to promoting access to sustainable livelihoods. 
Both urban and rural communities focused on the importance of strengthening local disaster 
preparedness activities with a focus on the following: (i) acquisition of basic material and equipment 
of relief operations; (ii) implementation of disaster preparedness training to cover the broader community 
(and not only local officials), and (iii) putting in place a local system for relief and recovery operations 
(considered lacking in the majority of the areas visited).  





2.1 Research themes and site selection  
 
The Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM) study of communities and households adversely affected 
by Ondoy and Pepeng in 2009 provides an overview of their recovery and of the long term social 
impacts of these disasters. The SIM builds on the initial analysis of the social impacts carried out in the 
immediate aftermath of the typhoons1 and focuses on the following central themes of: (i) livelihoods and 
socio-economic adaptations (including an analysis of indebtedness); (ii) social relations; (iii) local governance, 
and (iv) resettlement and relocation (please see Table 1 for additional details).  The insights provided by the 
study are intended to inform reconstruction efforts with a particular focus on the Metro Manila urban 
renewal strategy. 
Table 1:  Focus areas and data sets 
 








 Employment and livelihood (re-establishment, new opportunities, loss of employment 
and/or income) 
 Alternative/complementary sources of income  
 Changes in intra-household allocation of resources 
 Recovery of productive assets (focus on small/home-based businesses) 
 Coping strategies 
 Contributions to family care and income 
 Changes in access to basic services (disruption and re-establishment of access) 
 Sources of recovery assistance and support (government programs, civil 
society/private sector interventions, family support, including domestic/foreign 
remittances)  
 Credit needs and changes in uses  
 
 
                                                          
1 The SIA was conducted in the aftermath of Ondoy, which hit the Philippines on September 26, 2009, causing widespread flooding 
in Metro Manila and surrounding areas, and Pepeng which affected, in particular, Central and Northern Luzon from October 3 to 9, 
2009. The Institute of Philippine Culture conducted the assessment of the social impact of Ondoy on urban poor communities in 
Metro Manila, Rizal, and Laguna. The full text of the report can be found at http://pdf.ph/downloads/PDNA/PDNA-
Social_Impact_Assessment_FINAL_20100725.pdf. A team from the World Bank and the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development conducted the social impact assessment of peri-urban and urban communities affected by Pepeng. Both studies were 
conducted in November 2009. A summary of both reports was included in the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) 
commissioned by the Government of the Philippines in November 2009. The PDNA text can be accessed using the following link 
http://www.worldbank.org.ph/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/PHILIPPINESEXTN/0,,conte
ntMDK:22405100~menuPK:3968175~pagePK:64027988~piPK:64027986~theSitePK:332982,00.html 
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Focus areas Data sets 
 
Access to credit and indebtedness 
 Sources of credit (formal and informal, changes in availability of credit) 
 Conditions of loans (changes in rates, re-payment periods, collateral) 
 Ability to repay and consequences of defaulting 
 Savings 
 
Social relations  Changes in gender and intergenerational relations 
 Social support networks, family-based, community-based, or otherwise 
 Community mobilization and response in the reconstruction phase (role of 
community associations and instances of collective action) 




 Response/assistance given to affected communities/individuals by national 
government agencies and city/municipality/barangay LGU 
 Forms/modes of response/assistance/help rendered when, how, to which 
communities/groups/individuals in the community  
 Exclusion of particular groups from reconstruction support (or perception of 
inequitable distribution of benefits) 
 Quality of response 
 Sustainability of response 
 Problems, concerns, issues  
 Community recommendations on how to improve recovery and reconstruction 
efforts; role of  (i) government, (ii) civil society, and (iii) community 
Resettlement 




 Current housing conditions  
 Changes in residence (location, living arrangements – sharing, renting, alternative 
living arrangements for other family members) 
 Share of income spent on housing/rent, ability to pay and consequences of defaulting 
 Recovery assistance received for loss of housing/damage to housing (source of 
support, adequacy, and equity) 
 Perception of risk of further disasters in current location  
 Impact of resettlement/relocation intervention on access to basic services, and access 
to employment and livelihoods (income) 
  
Data was collected in a total of 21 sites in four cities in Metro Manila and nine provinces in 
Luzon. Qualitative research was undertaken in the same 18 sites studied in the 2009 SIA (eight urban 
and ten rural/peri-urban communities). In addition, the SIM qualitative module also covered Taguig City, 
where a social impacts assessment had been carried out in 2009 by an AusAID team. Finally, quantitative data 
was collected from Southville 5A (Biñan, Laguna) in Eusébio Bliss (Maybunga, Pasig). These two sites were 
selected to provide insights into the living conditions of communities resettled post-Ondoy/Pepeng. In 
particular, the information obtained helped to compare the outcomes of ―in-city‖ (Eusebio Bliss) and ―off-
city‖ (Southville 5A) resettlement. 
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Table 2: Research sites 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of study sites 
 The selection of sites was based on the premise 
that the pace and quality of recovery will be at least partly 
influenced by the following factors: (i) the severity of the 
storms‘ impacts (linked to geographical location), and (ii) the 
community‘s degree of social cohesion and social capital which 
is likely to influence their ability to mobilize resources. The 
research team, therefore, looked at a range of settlements 
exposed to different types of environmental vulnerability: 
coastal, lakeside, riverine and mountainous communities. In 
addition, the areas selected provided information on how 
recovery progressed in formal versus informal settlements. The 
research team focused on the existence or absence of 
community organizations as well as on the linkages with groups 
and institutions outside of the community. Additional details 
on site selection and typology can be found in Annex I. 
 The SIM used a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methodologies (please 
refer to Annex II for additional details). Community walkthroughs and participant observation were used 
to gain a fuller understanding of the everyday lives of households affected by Ondoy and Pepeng. A set of 
standard Focus Group Discussions (FDGs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted with 
Research 
method 
Urban Rural and peri-urban 
Qualitative 1. Barangay Malaban, Biñan City, Laguna 10. Barangay Puguis, La Trinidad, Benguet 
2. Southville 4, Barangay Caingin and 
Barangay Pooc, Santa Rosa City, Laguna 
11. Barangay Ambassador, Tublay, 
Benguet 
3. Gawad Kalinga Camacho Phase II, Nangka, 
Marikina City 
12. Barangay Poblacion, Baliuag, Bulacan 
4. Barangay Caudillo, Cabanatuan City, Nueva 
Ecija 
13. Barangay Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan 
5. Barangay Sapang Buho, Palayan City, 
Nueva Ecija 
14. Barangay Pulong Tamo, San Ildefonso, 
Bulacan 
6. Westbank Mangahan Floodway, Maybunga, 
Pasig City 
15. Barangay Natividad, Naguilian, La 
Union 
7. Barangay Doña Imelda, Quezon City 16. Barangay Tabucolan, Santa, Ilocos Sur 
8. Kasiglahan Village 1, San Jose, Montalban, 
Rizal 
17. Barangay East Carmen, Rosales, 
Pangasinan 
9. Barangay Wawa, Taguig City 18. Barangay Longos Central, San Fabian, 
Pangasinan 
19. Barangay Carael, Botolan, Zambales 
Quantitative  20. Eusebio BLISS, Maybunga, Pasig City  
21. Southville 5A, Langkiwa, Biñan, Laguna  
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different sub-groups within selected communities. Separate discussions were systematically held with women 
and youth2 with additional interviews carried out with vulnerable households identified by the communities 
themselves. In addition, the team also collected the perspectives of national and local government 
representatives as well as those of civil society groups.  Finally, a short survey was implemented in the two 
selected resettlement areas to enable the research team to quantify some of the patterns observed.  
Table 3: Distribution of key informants 
 






In all study sites except Southville 4A, Biñan City, Laguna and Maybunga, Pasig City: 
Household with the worst level of vulnerability to Ondoy/Pepeng (1) 
Household with high level of indebtedness (1) 
Community organization leader (1) 
Barangay captain (1) 
In Southville 4A, Biñan City, Laguna and Maybunga, Pasig City: 
Resettled households (2) 
80 





Municipal/city mayor/relocation and resettlement officer of local government 
units (1) 
Municipal/City Social Welfare Development Officer (MSWDO/CSWDO) (1)  
Community organization leader at the city/municipal level (1) 
57 
Key informants at 
the regional/ 
national level 
Leaders of various urban poor umbrella organizations in Metro Manila  
National Housing Authority 
Administrator of a government-owned lot partly occupied by informal settlers 
Credit providers 
8 
Total  145 
 
Ensuring that research questions and recommendations feed into policy discussions on 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management as well as on the Metro Manila Urban Renewal agenda 
was an important part of the SIM exercise.  A SIM Reference Group comprised of representatives from 
government agencies, civil society groups and development partners working on these issues was convened.3 
The reference group‘s inputs were instrumental in validating and finalizing the research questions and 
approach used by the research team.4  These consultations aimed to ensure that the questions asked during 
data collection would generate information relevant to the stakeholders responsible for implementing 
different aspects of these two agendas. Secondly, the draft report and key findings were presented in a second 
                                                          
2 Aged between 14 and 18 
3 The Reference Group met on April 4, 2011 and on July 29, 2011. It included representatives from the following offices and groups: 
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department of Interior and Local Government, National Housing Authority, 
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, Philippine Association of Social Work, Community Organizing 
Multiversity, Urban Poor Associates, and Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies, Inc. AusAID provided additional 
comments in separate consultations. 
4 An orientation workshop of field researchers was held on April 14 to 15, 2011 at the IPC, Ateneo de Manila University, and was 
attended by 20 of the 29 members of the field research teams. Two separate orientation meetings were conducted in Santa, Ilocos Sur 
(for Ilocos Sur field research team), and in Baguio City (for the Benguet/La Union/Pangasinan field research teams) on May 3 to 4, 
2011 and May 14, 2011, respectively. 
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meeting of the Reference Group. The round of discussions was primarily geared towards assessing the 
relevance and feasibility of the SIM‘s recommended strategies for change. It enabled the research team to 
further refine the recommendations presented in this report.   
 
The data collection and data analysis activities also included feedback sessions with: (i) 
communities that participated in the analysis, and (ii) mayors and municipal councils. These sessions 
gave the community and its LGU officials a sense of the data the research team was able to gather and made 
officials aware of the expectations of their constituents regarding the recovery process. Finally, they were an 
avenue to validate findings and collect additional feedback.  
2.2 What do we mean when we talk about recovery and reconstruction? 
 
What communities understood by “recovery” and “reconstruction” differs from the use of these 
terms by Government institutions and development practitioners.5 The questions: ―What does recovery 
mean to you?‖ and ―What does reconstruction mean to you‖ were asked systematically during FDGs.  For 
communities, ―recovery‖ implied the restoration of their quality of life to pre-disaster levels. 
―Reconstruction‖ was above all understood as the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure. Participants in the 
study illustrated their understanding of these terms with reference to the support received post-disaster 
although the ―self-help‖ dimension of recovery (―sariling sikap‖) was also frequently mentioned. 
The elements of recovery and reconstruction that were considered most significant varied across 
rural and urban areas. The severity of the disasters‘ impact and the perceived environmental vulnerability 
were the two other relevant factors influencing community responses.  
The dimension of recovery assistance more frequently mentioned by the participants in the 
study was livelihood restoration. In rural communities, the emphasis was on the provision of agricultural 
inputs (with seeds and pesticides commonly mentioned), access to capital, and additional training. In urban 
areas the focus was on access to jobs and support for small businesses. Capital was considered essential for 
recovery across all sites. Informants consistently stated that recovery ―boils down to the money issue‖ (La Trinidad, 
Benguet) and referred to overcoming ―the trauma of the pocket” (West Bank Floodway, Pasig).  The second 
critical element of recovery in both rural and urban areas was housing assistance. This was particularly 
true for communities most severely affected and where a permanent resettlement solution had not yet been 
found. This was the case in Rosales (Pangasinan) and Botolan (Zambales), where respondents stressed that 
recovery meant ―having a place to live.6‖ Given the severity of the disasters‘ impacts in some areas7, recovery 
                                                          
5
 Recovery is defined by United Nations Strategy for Disaster Reduction as: ―The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of 
facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors.‖ 
Reconstruction, according to the same source, is typically defined as a sector under the Recovery framework 
(http://www.disasterassessment.org/section.asp?ID=22, accessed on June 23, 2011). The recovery task of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction begins soon after the emergency phase has ended, and should be based on pre-existing strategies and policies that 
facilitate clear institutional responsibilities for recovery action and enable public participation 
(http://unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf, accessed on June 23, 2011).  
 
 
7 This was observed in Botalan (Zambales), Rosales (Pangasinan) and Tublay (Benguet). Similar reactions were observed in Tublay 
where some of the residents report still being traumatized by their experiences during the typhoons: “Hay naku! Siya ka ti permi. Haan 
kami garud nga makaturog. Uray dagidiay uubing mi, natrauma da kitdi ah.” [Mine is worst (referring to her experience after the typhoons). I 
cannot sleep. Even the children experienced trauma.] 
Page 18 of 80 
 
from trauma was also raised as significant. Respondents in Rosales defined recovery as: ―when we can sleep 
soundly at night again without worrying too much about another impending danger.” 
On the other hand, the key dimension of reconstruction highlighted in all sites was 
the rehabilitation of infrastructure that would help minimize further damage caused by 
disasters. Communities, particularly in rural areas, expressed concern over their ongoing 
vulnerability: 8 ―Ngem syak talaga ti kayat ko, rehab kuma ngay idiay ayan mi. Tapno dakami idiay baba, haan 
kami nga magaburan, dagiyay ada idiay ngato, haan da nga matinnag.‖ (For me, what I really want is 
rehabilitation in our place for us living in the lower portion not to be affected in case there is 
landslide and those living in the upper portion not to fall due to landslide.)9 Respondents stressed 
what they understood as the additional infrastructure needed to make their place of residence safer.   
This commonly involved the reinforcement of seawalls and the construction or rehabilitation of 
dikes. In particularly vulnerable coastal areas (such as Santa Ilocos Sur) respondents put forward the 
possibility of moving the entire community to safer, higher ground.  




                                                          
8 In the neighboring towns of Bustos and Baliuag in Bulacan, communities stressed the need to finish the existing dike to protect low 
lying areas from flooding, particularly when water is let out of nearby dams.  Respondents from Botolan, Zambales, stressed that the 
existing dike needs to be rehabilitated and reinforced. 
9 FGD participant in Tublay, Benguet 
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Table 8:  Community understanding of recovery and reconstruction 
Recovery Reconstruction 
 ―Umaangat‖ or improving – community leaders perceive 
recovery as involving some form of long term 
assistance, including the provision of reconstruction 
materials to rebuild homes, livelihood programs, 
employment scholarships and housing. (Doña Imelda, 
Quezon City) 
 ―Loans‖ when someone is sick (Camacho II, Marikina 
City) 
 Relief goods (Wawa, Taguig City) 
 Food, clothing, kitchen and house ware, medicine, 
temporary wooden footbridges, cleaning and clearing 
activities, tree planting, food donation, relief goods, 
basic needs (San Fabian, Pangasinan) 
 Livelihood, borrowing money, agricultural crops as 
recovery strategies, puhunan para sa negosyo, pinansyal (San 
Ildefonso, Bulacan) 
 Short-term and uses fewer resources (Baliuag, Bulacan) 
 Livelihood, financial assistance (Tublay, Benguet) 
 Livelihood (Puguis, Benguet) 
 Pumping of floodwater, construction of 
elevated concrete path walks, jobs (Wawa, 
Taguig City) 
 Repair of infrastructure such, roads, earth 
dikes, housing repairs and donation of 
construction materials and tools (San Fabian, 
Pangasinan) 
 Capital intensive activities and infrastructure 
repair (Baliuag, Bulacan) 
 Living in less affected areas or resettlement 
(Tublay, Benguet) 
 Settlement of all financial obligations from 
loans, housing repairs and livelihood 
activities, overcoming the traumatic 
experience (Rosales, Pangasinan) 
 
 
Page 20 of 80 
 
 
3. Livelihoods and Socio-Economic Impact 
3.1 Long-term impact on household income  
 
 While communities targeted by the study reported an overall reduction in income since 
2009, households did not attribute their financial difficulties solely to Ondoy and Pepeng. They also 
linked their present difficulties to the current economic situation (i.e. increased prices of goods, fuel).  
 ―Hindi na dahil sa Ondoy…Kung sa Ondoy, naka-recover na talaga. Kaya lang iba na kasi talaga ngayon, mahirap 
na talaga. Pero hindi na yun dahilan sa Ondoy.‖ [It is not because of Ondoy. People have already recovered from 
Ondoy. It is different this time; life got harder.]. Doña Imelda, Quezon City 
―Oo kaya lang, malaking pagbabago kasi po noon, hindi matumal, hindi ano…minsan pagbebentahan mo, 
matumal na.  mahirap nang kumita.” [Yes. There was a big change because before things were not 
slow…most times what you sell is slow, it is hard to turn a profit.] (Botolan, Zambales) 
In particular, communities reported that specific lines of activity and sources of income had 
been in decline prior to 2009. This was clearly observed in two of the sites visited during the SIA, with a 
continuing downward trend confirmed by the SIM in: (i) Malaban, Laguna, and (ii) Santa, Ilocos Sur. In 
Malaban, participants in the study said that the shoe industry in the area had been experiencing difficulties 
over a number of years. Local producers reported a limited ability, even before Ondoy and Pepeng, to 
compete with larger manufacturers. The disaster and the resulting loss of assets and capital, therefore, 
aggravated an already difficult situation. Similarly, in Santa, Ilocos Sur, income from fishing had been 
progressively diminishing prior to 2009. The community reported that ipon, (goby fry) catches had been 
predictable in previous years, peaking from October to February. These typically ensured a steady income 
that helped meet family consumption needs.10 At the time of the assessment, however, ipon catches had 
become unpredictable and the amount of other fish caught insufficient to meet daily consumption needs.  
Focus Group Discussions and interviews, therefore, focused on identifying those impacts on 
income and livelihoods considered by the communities to have been brought about by the 2009 
disasters.  
Sources of income and the types of jobs available have remained the same pre and post Ondoy/Pepeng in all sites 
visited. 
Following the initial reconstruction work of damaged homes and small businesses, no new 
types of occupations were observed in the research sites. The main sources of income remained: (i) on-
farm work in rural areas, and (ii) small scale enterprises and informal sector jobs in urban areas, as outlined in 
Figure 3 below.  
 
                                                          
10 Ipon or goby fry is a small translucent (newly hatched) fish, which can fetch from Php 100.00 to Php 200.00 or more per kilo.  
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As was noted during the SIA, the types of jobs and small scale business opportunities 
continued to be more diversified in urban areas. In addition, wage work was also more frequently cited as 
a source of income in these sites. This is particularly relevant as salaried workers were considered the most 
likely to have recovered from the impact of the 2009 disasters, according to the participants in the study. Jobs 
in sales, services and factories were highly desired. They were, however, mentioned as available only to the 
more qualified young people in the community in Wawa (Taguig), Southville 4 (Laguna), GK Camacho 
(Marikina) and West Bank Floodway (Pasig). Informants noted these selection criteria were strictly enforced 
by recruitment companies, leaving older, less qualified residents to continue engaging in small-scale 
enterprises and in contractual and informal services sector. These included construction work, driving, 
providing domestic and laundry services – as was the case prior to the disaster. Residents continued to resort 
to this type of temporary work to supplement their family income: ―Ganun pa rin [ang mga trabaho sa barangay]. 
Kasi yun ang alam nilang trabaho.” [The types of jobs in the barangay are still the same. It‘s because these are the 
jobs that they are familiar with.] (taxi driver from Doña Imelda, Quezon City).  




Significant long term impacts on farmers and the self-employed (unskilled workers and small-scale business owners) 
Reductions in income were attributed to the loss of assets and capital caused by the 
typhoons and from which some categories of respondents (farmers, fishermen, small business 
owners and informal sector workers) did not fully recover.  Obtaining data on income using qualitative 
methods is challenging. The research team was able to collect information on the average earnings of the 
main occupational groups in urban areas.  
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Table 9: Average earnings in main types of occupations  
Occupations GK Camacho Phase II KV 1 Rizal 
Self-employed 
Skilled workers  
Construction (carpenters, electricians, mason 
and painters) 
 
Php 200 to Php 500/day  
 
Php 250 to Php 400/day 
Jeepney  drivers 
Taxi drivers 
Php 60 to Php 100/day 
Php 100 to Php 300/day  
 
Unskilled workers 
Pedi-cab  driver 
Tricycle driver 
Unskilled construction worker 
Domestic worker 
 
Php 60 to Php 100/day  
Php 100 to Php 150/day 
 
Php 50 to Php 100/day 
Php 60 to Php 200/day 
Php 150/day 
Php 300/day (irregular) 




Piece work (bags) 
 
Php 200 to Php 500 (irregular 
earnings 
Php 300 to Php 350 (one or 
twice/week) 
Php 10 to Php 15 per piece 









Qualified workers (LGU, stores and services) Php 4,500 to Php 
12,800/month 
Php 4,000/month 
Unskilled workers (LGU street sweepers) Php 500 to Php 1,000/week  
 
In all urban visited, the loss of capital and stock caused by Ondoy had a long term impact on 
small businesses and reduced their profitability. In a number of instances, small businesses closed and 
could not resume their activities due to heavy losses or to the need to divert capital to meet basic 
expenditures or conduct urgent housing repairs. “Malaki po talaga, hindi tulad noon na wala pang Ondoy na maluwag 
pa ang paghanap buhay namin. Hindi pa kami naubusan ng puhunan tsaka lalo na tumaas yung mga presyo ng bilihin. 
Ngayon kung gusto naming gumawa ng paraan minsan nalulugi pa kami dahil maliit lang ang puhunan. Magpuhunan ka na 
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ng limang daan hanggat maubos na ubos hindi nakaikot.” [The effect has been big.  Before Ondoy, it was easier to 
make a living. We never ran out of capital. The prices of goods have gone up and this has made it more 
difficult because the capital is small.  If you raise Php 500.00 for capital, it is next to impossible to turn a 
profit.] (Baliuag, Bulacan). Participants in the study noted that they now sold fewer and cheaper products, 
partly due to their inability to replenish stock lost during the floods and purchase new equipment. ―Naglalako 
po siya [asawa] ngayon hanggang isang libo na lang, pagkasyahin yung pinamimili niya ng DVD… mga charger [para sa 
cellphone], hindi na naibalik.” [My husband works around a capital of Php 1,000.00 for the DVD that he sells. 
He does not sell cell phone chargers anymore.] (A vendor‘s wife, Doña Imelda, Quezon City). In addition, 
street vendors resorted to selling in less secure locations (using karitons or pushcarts) to avoid the costs of 
obtaining a fixed site for trading their wares. This was the case in Doña Imelda (Quezon City), for example.  
In addition, even when local businesses were not directly affected or damaged, the fact that 
customers no longer had sufficient income to spend, severely reduced earnings and led to further 
closures. This was a pattern observed across all sites and can be illustrated with reference to the West Bank 
Floodway site in Maybunga, Pasig City. There, the location of small businesses enabled them to escape most 
of the damage. However, extensive destruction of homes in the area meant that a large number of households 
either moved to other sites or drastically reduced consumption. Demand for services such as tricycles, for 
example, dropped with more people willing to walk long distances in order to save. Similar reductions in 
profit were reported for sari-sari stores and other small business across urban sites: ―Bago mag-Ondoy, tatlong 
radio nare-repair ko sa isang araw pero di naman nila tinutubos, minsan inaabot pa ng isang linggo kaya wala din ako gasino 
nakukuha.” [Before Ondoy, I get to fix three radios in one day, but now they don‘t get them back.  
Sometimes, they don‘t get them for up to a week (Malaban, Laguna)]. “Kapag may order, gagawa kami, pero minsan 
kahit yung order di naman kami binabayaran.” [If there is an order, we make it but sometimes the customer does 
not pay (Malaban, Laguna)]. 
In rural areas, the destruction of the means of livelihood fields, gardens, fishponds, crops, 
animals (e.g. carabaos, fowls, pigs), and equipment (e.g. boats, fishing and farming equiment) had 
significant long term impacts on rural and peri-urban communities. (Botolan, Zambales; Naguilian, La 
Union; San Fabian, Pangasinan). In highly affected areas such as Botolan, Zambales, the size of arable land 
decreased following the typhoons 11 as did overall land productivity (the yield is currently only about 80% of 
what could be harvested previous to the 2009 typhoon season). Across12 nearly half of the rural sites, the 
damage caused to low-lying areas meant that a number of households permanently lost all or part of their 
land.  In addition, in these severely affected communities, respondents noted that: (i) hiring of agricultural 
laborers was reduced as land owners attempted to recover from the losses brought about by the disasters, and 
(ii) farming can become a secondary source of income if soil erosion has been extreme. This resulted in 
exceptional cases of migration to urban areas: ― We go to the city so we can get hired and earn‖. (Sabang Buho 
Nueva Ecija) 
 
                                                          
11 The October 2009 records of the Municipal Agriculture Office (MAO) in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, on damage caused by Ondoy and 
Pepeng, as well as by the flooding caused by the release of water from Pantabangan Dam, showed that a total of 273.89 hectares of 
rice farms in the municipality were affected with no chance of recovery. 
12 Botolan, (Zambales); San Fabian (Pangasinan), Tublay (Benguet), San Idelfonso (Bulacan) and Sapang Buho (Nueva Ecija) 
Page 24 of 80 
 
 
Similar to the trend observed in urban areas, the lack of capital to recover from these losses 
has required significant adaptations in the way affected households earn their living. Those engaged 
in capital-intensive livelihoods resorted to modified forms of their previous line of work that again 
required less inputs and investment. This was noted across all rural areas and can be exemplified with 
reference to Tublay (Benguet), where those who lost their land now work in neighboring farms, earning 
approximately Php 200.00 a day. “Syak met mam kasla observation ko mam, idi di awan pay ti ondoy mostly dagijay 
karkarruba mi saysayote da kasla da kmi ngem idi syempre di nalpas dyay awan ti pagsayotean kapilitan ag per day a kami,” 
one woman-resident disclosed.” [Ma‘am, my observation is before Ondoy most of the people in the neighborhood 
had farms and they planted sayote, but after the typhoon, they lost their farms and were forced to work in 
other people‘s farms.].  
 
Fishing was no longer a primary source of livelihood in any of the costal or riverine sites 
visited (as noted in the SIA) due to a steady decrease in catch. Fish farming did, however, play an 
important role as a complementary source of income. As with farmers, the loss of the investment made in 
fish farming equipment had long term negative effects. Where fish-pens were destroyed by Ondoy, fish 
farmers were unable to secure the capital needed to return to their initial line of activity.   
 
Across all rural sites, respondents highlighted that available capital had been diverted away 
from their income generation activities to meet basic consumption needs. There was a widespread shift 
to less secure occupations. Participants reported working as daily laborers at markets, construction workers, 
tricycle drivers, domestic workers or labanderas (doing laundry), with the amount earned remaining insufficient 
to meet daily needs: 
 
―May palaisdaan po ako (noong bago ang Ondoy). Inutang ko po ang ginamit ko doon. Sa pagdaan ng Ondoy ay na-
wash out po lahat.  Para ho akong nagbalik sa zero…” […I had a fish pen before Ondoy. The capital I used in 
putting it up just came from a loan. Then Ondoy came and washed everything away. Now, it feels like I‘m 
back to zero.] 
 
“Ngayon ay kailangan pa nilang mag-tindera na lang, nagtitinda na lang sa bayan ng hindi sariling yari o kaya 
mamamasukan sa konstruksiyon….dati may sarili silang puhunan, sariling gamit, may tindang sariling materyales….ang 
puhunan nawala!” [Now they have to work as mere sellers, they sell in town stuff that they didn‘t make, or they 
work in construction sites. In the past, we had our own capital, our own materials; now even capital we don‘t 
have!]   
 
Within communities: different recovery trajectories. 
Wage workers in urban areas and in exceptional cases, households with family members 
working abroad, had a sufficiently steady stream of resources to offset the impact of the 2009 disasters.  
Regular income enabled these households to continue borrowing and making regular debt payments. These 
cases, however, constitute a minority of respondents. The research team found only two instances of 
communities households with connections to overseas workers (Wawa, Taguig, and Gawad Kalinga Camacho 
Phase II) and a reduced number of sites where wage work in services and sales was reported as a source of 
income. The latter were all urban areas: Malaban, Biñan City, Laguna; Southville 4,  Santa Rosa City, Laguna; 
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Gawad Kalinga Camacho Phase II, Nangka, Marikina City; Westbank Mangahan Floodway, Maybunga, Pasig 
City; Kasiglahan Village 1, San Jose, Montalban, Rizal, and Wawa, Taguig City 
In two of the rural communities visited, increased prices of agricultural commodities had 
played an important part in the recovery of some of the affected households. In Sapang Buho, Nueva 
Ecija, respondents indicated that their recovery process started in 2011 as ―it was only this time that the price of 
onion went high‖.  Some households in Tublay (Benguet) were also able to take advantage of higher prices of 
cut flowers to generate additional income. As with wage work in urban areas, this constitutes the exception to 
the overall trend of decreased earnings observed across sites.  
Communities were consistent in their views of who the most vulnerable among them were. 
These were the households that had suffered the most serious losses. In rural areas, these were without 
exception residents who owned land in low-lying areas. In urban areas, they were primarily small business 
owners in ―danger areas‖ of the community. The fact that households‘ means of livelihood have become 
increasingly insecure also means that residents consider those with elderly or sick relatives as particularly 
vulnerable. With household income being fully absorbed by spending on basic needs, unforeseen medical 
expenses can have a critical impact on the family‘s budget. In addition, across rural and urban areas, the 
overall perception was that the widespread move to less profitable occupations made women more 
vulnerable. Skills mostly held by men (in construction, for example) tended to be higher demand for the 
repair of damaged houses. Demand for the type unskilled work mostly carried out by women, including 
domestic work or laundry services, tended to drop, as this was one of the areas in which households could 
save. ―Mga karpintero, hindi nawala. Pero yun mga kababaihan nawalan ng trabaho po.” [The carpenters did not lose 
their jobs.  But the women lost their jobs.] (Botolan, Zambales). 
3.2 Limited assistance for livelihood restoration  
 
 Livelihood assistance was provided to the vast majority of the communities covered in the 
study. Within the 20-month period that followed Ondoy and Pepeng, 18 of the 21 areas visited had 
received some form of financial assistance.  The exceptions were Poblacion (Baliuag), Malaban (Biñan), 
and Southville 5A, where households (96.8% of those surveyed) indicated receiving no livelihood support 
directly related to post Ondoy/Pepeng recovery.  The primary sources of support mentioned by respondents 
were as follows:  
 Existing social protection and livelihoods programs implemented by DSWD. While these are 
not emergency or disaster response programs they were seen by participants in the study as providing 
key resources during their recovery. The existing Conditional Cash Transfer program, Pantawid 
Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4 Ps)13 was mentioned by respondents in two of the sites visited. The 
                                                          
13 ―The Pantawid Pamilya is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program which provides cash to beneficiary households, subject to 
compliance with program conditionalities. The Pantawid Pamilya is targeted at chronicly poor households with children aged 0-14 
years who are located in poor areas. The cash grants range from P500 (US$11) to P1,400 (US$32) per household per month, 
depending on the number of eligible children. To qualify for the grants, beneficiary households must undertake certain activities that 
are meant to improve the children‘s health and education such as visiting health centers regularly, sending the children to school, and 
undertaking preventive check-ups for pregnant women.‖ By January 2011 the program had approximately one million beneficiaries, 
World Bank (2011), Social Protection Note Overview of the Philippines‘ Conditional Cash Transfer Program: The Pantawid Pamilyang 
Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya) 
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Self- Employment Assistance program (SEA-K)14 was present in 12 communities, primarily rural 
and, in all cases, pre-dating the disaster. 
 Cash or Food for Work was implemented by local governments in partnership with international 
development partners (World Food Program), civil society organizations and, in some instances, the 
private sector.  Communities in ten of the 19 sites covered reported receiving this type of assistance. 
The amounts or in kind support provided to beneficiaries, the type and duration of work and the 
targeting system used varied significantly across sites. 
 
 Emergency grants or loans were also made available to the most affected households by local 
government and civil society organizations. This type of support was noted in 12 of the sites 
covered, with the amounts provided varying from Php 8,000.00 to Php 2,000 (approximately US$186 
to US$45). The conditions, intended uses of the loans or grants, and the criteria used for targeting 
varied greatly as did the repayment conditions (where applicable). In a significant number of cases 
the capital made available through these schemes was diverted away from livelihood activities, and 
was used instead for housing reconstruction. As highlighted in Table 11 below instances were also 
noted where funds normally used for running small businesses were needed to meet basic 
consumption expenses.  












                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
14 The SEAK Program  is a community-based, credit assistance program utilizing people‘s organizations called SEA Kaunlaran 
Associations (SKAs). The program supports poor households to develop and implement micro-enterprise projects providing capital 
and technical assistance. In 2009, there were 1,389 SEA-K projects established benefiting 28,939 families nationwide. Funds 
amounting to Php143,089,000 million had been released as seed capital for the livelihood projects. (http://www.dswd.gov.ph) 





Target Area Short-term Longer Term Gaps and community 
observations 
1. Barangay Malaban, 
Biñan City, Laguna 
  Participants outlined the lack 
of support for livelihood 
rehabilitation 
 
Reports of capital used for 
small businesses used for basic 
consumption 
 
2. Southville 4, Barangay 
Caingin and Barangay 
Pooc, Santa Rosa City, 
Laguna 
Emergency Grants/Loans  
provided by municipal 
governments  (Php 5,000) 
Livelihood training provided 
by TESDA for relocated 
households 
Participants outlined the lack 
of capital and continued 
technical assistance for 
livelihood rehabilitation. These 
gaps limited the usefulness of 
the vocational training 
provided 
3. Gawad Kalinga 
Camacho Phase II, 
Nangka, Marikina City 
Cash for Work implemented 
by CSOs and the city LGU 
(approximately 300 beneficiary 
households with Php 100/day 
or Php 500-1,000/week 




provided by municipal 
governments * 
  
4. Barangay Caudillo, 
Cabanatuan City, 
Nueva Ecija 
Food for Work/Training 
(limited number of 
beneficiaries) 
Self-Employment Assistance 
(Php 3,000 to 5,000) 
Participants stressed that the 
assistance received had been 
very limited. They highlighted 
the importance of capital for 
livelihood restoration as well 
as on-going technical 
assistance 
5. Barangay Sapang 
Buho, Palayan City, 
Nueva Ecija 
Emergency Grants/Loans 
provided by municipal 
governments * 
Self-Employment Assistance 
(Php 3,000 to 5,000) 
 
Seed and fertilizer subsidies 
(DA and Local Governments) 
Participants stressed that the 
assistance received had been 
limited and highlighted the 
lack of capital for livelihood 
restoration 




provided by municipal 
governments (Php 5,000) * 
 
Conditional Cash Transfers 
(Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino 
Program) with 200 beneficiaries 
 
Cash for Work (28 
beneficiaries) 
 
Food for Work (100 
beneficiaries provided with 25 
kg of rice for four hour daily 
work during a three day 
period) 
 
Vegetable selling business 
initiated by a barangay 
counselor (15 beneficiaries) 
 
Livelihood loans provided by 
the San Miguel Corporation 
(Php 5,000 to 10,000) for 200 
beneficiaries 
Unsustainability of livelihood 
interventions as capital is 
diverted to meet basic 
livelihood needs 
Table 10: Assistance received for livelihood recovery 




7. Barangay Doña 
Imelda, Quezon City 
Cash/Food for Work 
 
Conditional Cash Transfers 
(Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino 
Program) 
 Participants outlined the lack 
of longer term support for 
livelihood rehabilitation  
8. Kasiglahan Village 1, 
San Jose, Montalban, 
Rizal 
Cash/Food for Work (300 to 
400 beneficiaries receiving 
between Php 1,000 to Php 
1,200 as well as rice for two 
weeks‘ work) 
 
Livelihood loans and 
livelihood training (provided 
by CSOs) to an estimated 30 
beneficiaries.  
  
9. Barangay Wawa, 
Taguig City 
Emergency loans for small 




Cash for Work (120 
beneficiaries receiving 
approximately Php 110 for 




(Php 5,000 provided to 25 
beneficiaries) 
 
Loans for livelihood activities 
provided by the municipal 
government in partnership 
with CSO, private sector 
organization (Php 5,000 seed 
capital for 30 beneficiarie; hp 
3,000 with a cell-phone 
provided to 37 beneficiaries. 
 
Jobs fairs conducted by PESO 
(job placements for young 
people in call centers and 
factories) 
 
Skills training in handy crafts 
(dried flowers) sponsored. 
 
 
10. Eusebio BLISS, 
Maybunga, Pasig City 
 Self-Employment Assistance 
(Php 3,000 to 5,000) 
 
11. Southville 5A, 
Langkiwa, Biñan, 
Laguna 
  Participants indicated the lack 
of financial assistance received 






Target Area Short-term Longer Term Gaps and community 
observations 
1. Barangay Puguis, La 
Trinidad, Benguet 
Cash/Food for Work 
 
Emergency Grants/Loans 
provided by municipal 
governments (Php 5,000)* 
 
Self-Employment Assistance  
 
Small scale skills training 
initiative by a private donor 
(Php 35,000) with additional 
resources allocated to a 
livelihood fund Php 500,000 
by the area‘s Congressman 
 
The participants highlighted: 
(i) the lack of longer-term 
assistance provided; (ii) the 
lack of capital for livelihood 
restoration and (iii) the need 
for credit at lower interest 
rates 




2. Barangay Ambassador, 
Tublay, Benguet 
Emergency Grants/Loans 
provided by municipal 
governments (Php 8,000 to 
Php 3,000 depending on the 
damage to property provided 
to 24 households) * 
 
Food for Work 
Self-Employment Assistance  
 
Livelihoods training and in-
kind support provided by CSO 
(animal husbandry) with 
approximately 104 beneficiary 
households 
 
Unsustainability of the 
livelihood recovery activities 
initiated by CSO with no 
market for new products.  
 
Lack of capital highlighted as 
an important limiting factor in 
livelihood recovery. 
3. Barangay Poblacion, 
Baliuag, Bulacan 
  While participants highlighted 
the relief assistance received 
no livelihood rehabilitation 
programs were  mentioned 
during FDGs and KIIs  
4. Barangay Poblacion, 
Bustos, Bulacan 
Emergency Grants/Loans 
provided by municipal 
governments *  
 
Food for Work covering 
approximately 180 households  
Self-Employment Assistance 
(Php 5,000 provided to 25 
beneficiaries) 
 
Livelihood training (candle 
making, cell phone repair, food 
processing for a limited 







Community highlighted the 
lack of support to small 
businesses 
5. Barangay Pulong 
Tamo, San Ildefonso, 
Bulacan 
Support provided by the 
Department of Agriculture in 
the form of seed 
subsidies(approximately 180 
farmers) and fertilizer 
subsidies (20 farmers) 
Self-Employment Assistance 
pre-dating Ondoy/Pepeng 
with 30 beneficiaries (Php 





The lack of capital was 
highlighted as factor limiting 
livelihood recovery. Other 
important gaps in the 
assistance provided were: (i) 
assistance in marketing their 
produce, (ii) assistance to 
diversify livelihoods (livestock 
rearing for example) and (iii) 
training on new technologies. 
6. Barangay Natividad, 
Naguilian, La Union 
Cash/Food for Work 
 
Emergency Grants provided 
by municipal governments  
(Php 2,000 to households 
identified as poor)* 
 
Emergency Grants provided 
by the Philippines‘ Red Cross 
(Php 7,000) for livelihood 
activities to five families 
 
Self-Employment Assistance  
 
Livelihood training provided 
by the Philippines Red Cross 
(food processing) 
 
Unsustainability of small-scale 
business ventures primarily 
because capital was diverted to 
meet daily consumption needs 
7. Barangay Tabucolan, 
Santa, Ilocos Sur 
Emergency Grants/Loans 
provided by municipal 
governments * 
Self-Employment Assistance  
 
Skills training conducted by 
the municipality (limited 
number of beneficiaries) 
 
Participants highlighted: (i) 
difficulties in accessing training 
for specific skills that would 
help them find overseas 
employment (distance to 
training venue and cost); (ii) 
lack of capital for livelihood 
restoration 















8. Barangay East Carmen, 
Rosales, Pangasinan 
Emergency Grants provided 
by the Philippines‘ Red Cross 
(Php 7,000) for livelihood 
activities 
 
Availability of Php 5,000 loans 




Participants highlighted that 
they did not agreed with the 
proposed re-payment 
conditions of the municipal 
livelihood loans. 
 
Grants provided by the Red 
Cross were often diverted 
from livelihood recovery to 
housing reconstruction. 
 
There were reports of some 
households relocation due to 
the lack of livelihood 
opportunities. 
9. Barangay Longos 
Central, San Fabian, 
Pangasinan 
 Self-Employment Assistance 
 
Php 500 seed capital provided 
to 310 beneficiaries to start a 
vegetable selling business 
 
Participants highlighted the 
limited assistance received for 
livelihood recovery with some 
reporting receiving no 
assistance 
10. Barangay Carael, 
Botolan, Zambales 
 Self-Employment Assistance 
 
Livelihood training provided 
(beauticians, food processing) 




challenges in using the training 
received to establish small 
businesses: (i) insufficient time 
due to child care 
responsibilities; (ii) lack of 
capital was considered the 
main obstacle to livelihood 
restoration 
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Lack of capital remains the single biggest obstacle to recovery 
With the exception of Wawa (Taguig) and Baliuag (Bulacan) all of the remaining communities 
considered that the support provided did not respond to their long-term livelihood recovery needs. 
While some form of livelihood assistance was observed by the research team in the majority of sites, the 
overall perception was that the amount of resources made available during the recovery phase was 
insufficient.  
“Basta wala talaga yang pangmatagalan [na assistance]. Pero yung tulong na ano [relief], meron naman.” [There was no 
long-term assistance. But there was relief.] (Community leader, Doña Imelda, Quezon City)  
“Wala naman tumulong sa amin. Puro lang relief goods. Pero yung sabi na pang puhunan, wala.” [No one assisted us. 
There were only relief goods. But when it comes to financial assistance for livelihood, there was 
none.] (Street sweeper, Doña Imelda, Quezon City).  
“Dakkel ti pasalamat mi ti tulong nga inted da. Adu piman ti tinmulong idi nga nagited ti makan kas kuma ti 
bagas, pansit ken badbadu. Ngem apigbiit ngay dagitoy haan na nga nasabet tit alga nga kasapulan mi… jay kuma 
pagbalayan ken pangtulong ti pagbiagan nu ada panakabalin na… ni dandani manen panagtotodo…” [We are much 
thankful for the help they gave us. A lot gave us food like rice, noodles, and clothing. However, these 
were for our short-term needs, and they did not answer our real needs. We want house and livelihood 
assistance if it is possible…the rainy season is near again…] (La Trinidad, Benguet) 
Adu piman ti naitulong da kadakami idi ada kami jay Puguis Elementary School nga  nagbalin nga evacuation 
center idi. Adu ti makan kas kuma bagas, noodles ken badbadu mi ngem idi mapalabas ti manu nga domingo ket awan 
met naitulong nga pagbiagan, nga pagrugian kuma manen… kasla ngay nga apagbiit lang dagijay nga tulong…ngem 
agpasalamat kami met ketdi…” [They helped us a lot when we were in the evacuation site, Puguis 
Elementary School. They gave us rice, noodles, and clothing, but after few weeks they did not help us in 
any form of livelihood, through which we could start again…as if the help given to us was on a short-
term basis. We are thankful though.] (La Trinidad, Benguet) 
The most frequently mentioned factor behind the inability to resume a profitable livelihood 
activity was the lack of capital: “ Anyone can attend the training but it‟s all lecture. All they do is teach.” (Botolan, 
Zambales) This view was echoed in 17 of the 19 sites where the qualitative research module was implemented 
(including all rural areas). In a number of instances communities reported that the amount of the loans or 
grants being made available in their communities‘ was not sufficient to purchase stock or repair equipment to 
resume their livelihood activities. 
Kurang met Php 5000.00...kurang... [Php 5,000.00 is not enough.] (Local leader, Rosales, Pangasinan) 
 
Kailangan Php 10,000.00. [It must be Php 10,000.00.] (Local leader, Rosales, Pangasinan) 
 
Before Ondoy, it was easier to make a living. We never ran out of capital.  The prices of goods have gone up and it 
has made it more difficult because the capital is small.  If you raise Php 500.00 for capital, it is next to 
impossible to turn a profit. Poblacion (Baliuag, Bulacan) 
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The research team systematically observed that funds set aside for livelihood activities were 
diverted to cover basic household needs. This included basic consumption, medical care, or urgent 
housing repairs. In three of sites visited the need to divert funds away from livelihood activities was 
highlighted as the main reason for the lack of sustainability of the small-business interventions supported in 
the aftermath of Ondoy and Pepeng.    
 
―The five families that lost their houses to Pepeng received Php 7,000.00 each as starting capital for their livelihood. One 
recipient put up a sari-sari store, another began a business of selling rice and frozen goods, and one became a balot and chicharon 
vendor. The fourth recipient used the money to revive her dressmaking livelihood by putting it as capital for tela (cloth). The fifth 
recipient bought a sow that has now given birth to piglets. Among these, the only ones that are left alive are the balot-chicharon 
business, the dressmaking shop, and the “sow-raising” livelihood…the one who engaged in selling rice has used up the finances of 
the business for the family‟s daily needs. On the other hand, the sari-sari store closed down because the capital had to be used for 
medical expenses.” Natividad (Naguilian, La Union) 
 
Improvements in the design of skills training and livelihood programs  
Participants in the study also highlighted the importance of ensuring that the livelihood training 
provided was relevant to their context and local markets. In seven of the 19 areas visited, participants 
stressed that the way in which the training had been provided limited their ability to use the skills learned in a 
profitable occupation.  The main shortcomings of the skills and livelihood support provided were as follows:  
 Skills selected for training were not always relevant for the local market. Communities 
systematically highlighted the limited linkages between training and access to employment. 
Respondents stressed the need to reinforce partnerships with potential employers. 
―Tuturo ng mga dapat na pakinabangan. Actually nga, wala na eh. Hindi naman sila gumagawa ng pabrika ang 
Gobyerno para yung napag-aralan namin maibuhos namin doon, para walang squatter. Walang tambay, di ba? Kung 
yung tinuturo sa atin, paggawa ng sabon, paggawa ng kendi, tocino, longganisa… at naipasok tayo sa mga pabrikang 
dapat na tutulong sa atin, yun ang tulong na pangmatagalan.” [Teach us something that can benefit us. We 
have none of that. The Government does not even put up factories where we can apply the things 
that we learn from livelihood trainings. And then there will be no more squatters or bums. If they 
teach us how to manufacture soap, candy, tocino, longganisa, and at the same time hire us in 
factories were we can get regular employment, that becomes long-term assistance.], Doña Imelda, 
Quezon City. 
 The lack of continued support, including to market and sell products, limited the 
profitability of the small businesses. The respondents suggested that livelihood and skills training 
include the development of marketing strategies. 
 Particularly in rural areas and peri-urban areas, respondents highlighted the importance of 
diversifying livelihood opportunities and of receiving training on the use of new technologies. 
Where the income from farming had been decreasing having access to alternative sources of income 
was seen as crucial: ―We need alternative livelihoods, especially for the women, so that they do not 
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have to depend on their husband farmers. They do not have to depend on the farms alone. 
Calamities are always a problem for farmers.‖ (Palayan, Nueva Ecija). Respondents also stressed the 
importance of new knowledge about high yielding and more profitable crops, or the use of new 
pesticides and equipment: “Karagdagang kaalaman tungkol po sa mga tanim. Hindi naman po kasi yung peste 
noon araw ay yun pa rin yung peste ngayon. May mga bagong lumalabas na bago.‖ [Additional knowledge about 
farming. The pests now are not the same as the pests before. There are new types coming out.], 
Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija). 
 
3.3. Coping strategies 
 
The most common coping strategies observed by the research team were consistent with the 
trends seen during the SIA. As outlined in Figure 4, they remained: (i) taking on additional or temporary 
jobs where available, (ii) reducing consumption, and (iii) getting multiple loans, including for basic 
expenditures.  




In spite of multiple jobs, income remains insufficient to cover basic consumption needs 
 
 
The low skill set of respondents and the lack of capital, aggravated by the 2009 disasters, seem to 
have contributed to a concentration of respondents in a reduced number of occupations. These tend 
to be gender-segregated, with men occupying better paid construction jobs, as well as more insecure jobs in 
the transport sector (ranging from driving taxis, to jeepneys and finally to taxis and pedicabs). Men remain the 
primary income earners in all sites. Women are primarily found in domestic and laundry services. They are 
also responsible for managing sari-sari stores and a number of home-based businesses (including piece work), 
which give them greater flexibility to simultaneously handle domestic tasks. Sari-sari stores are extremely 
widespread, with respondents indicating that at least four or five exist in the immediate vicinity of their 
homes. Other types of small businesses are significantly rarer, particularly in rural areas, as illustrated in Figure 
5 below. This lack of diversity in the types of informal work available seems, in some instances, to have 
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contributed to decreased earnings. This is the case for pedicab drivers, for example, where intense 
competition for passengers has reduced profits.  




Income is, therefore, very uncertain (Table 9 above) and the lack of a steady income requires 
that households be highly opportunistic in pursuing livelihood opportunities. The need to meet 
specific monthly expenditures, like utility bills or transport costs, systematically require that all household 
members contribute to the family budget:  
 
―Yung mga lalaki nagcoconstruction pumapasok sa mga water…naghuhukay gumawa ng tubo…tapos yung ibang 
nagtatanim na pwepwede sa taniman [The men do construction work or dig for pipe-laying and then there are 
others who plant in areas which can be planted on].‖ When money is particularly tight, the entire family 
pitches in to meet a financial goal. “Kami naman kapag bill na ng kuryente biglaan na putulan ka sama-sama kami 
maglaba ng plastic [When the electric bill arrives and we are about to get cut off, we all pitch in and wash 
plastic].‖  This type of work—cleaning dirty plastic—yields PhP 30.00 per ten kilos of cleaned plastic. 






















Earning an income by driving a pedicab in KV1 
 There are more than 600 units operating in the 
area (excluding unlicensed operators). A pedicab 
driver has to spend Php 10,000 to purchase a cab 
and Php 3,000 to Php 3,500 for licenses and other 
administration expenses. This puts owning their 
own vehicles out of reach for a significant number 
of residents. Average earnings are usually between 
Php 60 to Php 100 per day. Rent to the pedicab‘s 
owner is due daily on weekdays (Php 40). ―Nay 
Ime‖, a woman pedicab driver from KV1, reports 
that the income that remains to meet her family‘s 
needs is currently around Php 50/day. Nay Ime 
used to earn more previously. A greater number of 
cabs in the area, however, led to ―cut throat‖ 
competition for passengers. 
With the exception of wage workers or 
skilled workers in the construction sector, 
therefore, taking on additional work has not 
enabled households to meet basic 
consumption needs. The main categories of 
expenditure were consistent across all sites: (i) 
food, making up to 80 percent of the household 
budget, (ii) utility bills (water and electricity), (iii) 
transport to work and to school, and (iv) rent. 
Interestingly, medical expenses were not factored 
into the household budget. Regular income is not 
sufficient to deal with medical costs in case of 
illness of a household member: ―Those who get sick 
are not given full support in terms of medicine.‖ (Palayan 
City, Nueva Ecija). Participants in the study 
frequently referred to medical expenses as 
―occasional expenses‖ in the same category as ―vices 
and extras‖.  
 





Transportation costs are essential to get to work and to school. While there are isolated reports 
of community members willing to walk longer distances to save on transport costs, it is usually by 
cutting down on food that respondents reduce household expenses. Reducing the number of meals and 
the quality of the food consumed was observed in all urban sites, without exception. Interestingly, only half 
of rural communities explicitly referred to reduced food in-take as a coping strategy. Close ties with 
neighbors, a culture of tulungan (solidarity) and the ability to grow some produce for home-consumption were 
the main reasons put forward by respondents to explain these patterns: ―For example, we will borrow rice from our 
neighbor, our neighbor will give us some. Next time if they borrow some rice from us, we will give them some as well. In spite of 
the hard times, we can always find something to eat”[…] “ If you are not picky you will not run out of viands here‖ (San 
Idelfonso, Bulacan).  
 
As was noted in the SIA, children frequently go to school without an allowance to purchase food. 
The household budget cannot cover both the cost of transport and food: “ She does it as a sacrifice. She 
knows we do not have money. She goes to school with only transportation money in hand. She puts up with her hunger until she 
arrives here.‖ (Southville 4, Santa Rosa Laguna)  In a significant number of instances, households will cut other 
categories of expenses before removing their children from school. There is an explicit recognition that 
attending school is essential if children are to be able to earn a better living than their parents: ―Education is a 
burden we must bear, we pay for it by forgoing what we can eat instead. Education‟s for free. For our school children‟s allowance, 
Php 20 should be enough.‖ (Malaban, Laguna). I worked as a house help and my husband did construction work so that our 
eldest child could finish elementary education. And then when we get home from work, we do farm labor so we can pay our 
debts.‖ ( Palayan City, Nueva Ecija) 
 
 
While removing children from school all together was a last resort, the number of sites where 
households reported they could no longer afford schooling expenses increased from 2009 to 2011, as 
did the instances of children working. The SIA indicated that in the majority of areas children had 
returned to school after the initial disruption caused by the floods. Reports of children temporarily dropping 
out of school or working (primarily by recovering scrap material) were found in six sites in 2009 and in nine 
in 2011:  
 
 ―Children stopped going to school due to the poverty of their parents. Sometimes they just roam around. They scavenge for 
plastic that they can sell, so that they can help.‖  (Malaban, Laguna).  ―My child who was in grade 2 had to stop because my 
husband and I had no means of earning. We are hired farm laborers and we go out of the barangay so that we can work in the 
fields. (Palayan City, Nueva Ecija) 
 
―Tsaka yung paghahakot…kasi paglabas mo dyan e maghakot ka lang kikita ka na…kahit mga bata, karaniwan 
nangangalakal…mga plastic yung mga pwedeng irecycle.” [Hauling…just around the area, you can just haul junk and 
you can turn a profit.  Even the children, most of them trade recyclable plastics.]  Poblacion, Baliuag, 
(Bulacan) 
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Taking on multiple loans, including for basic household expenses, is essential to make ends meet 
 
Financial support from relatives continued to be rare, in line with the SIA findings. Being able to 
rely on financial help from family was reported in four of the 19 research sites. This type of support was 
primarily extended in the form of loans. In only one of the research sites (Botolan, Zambales), did 
respondents refer to ―cash gifts‖. These were sporadic and made available in emergency situations (with 
amounts ranging from Php 1,300 to Php 3,000).  
 
The practice of borrowing from multiple sources seems to have intensified in all research areas. 
Respondents sought credit not only for livelihood activities or unexpected expenses (such as medical 
emergencies) but also to cover basic needs: ―There are lots of items included in the budget: school, capital, food, electricity 
and water. Half goes to livelihood capital and then for school. Our earnings are not enough. I am able to send my child to school 
through debts. After harvest I pay them off slowly.” (Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija) 
 
3.4 Access to credit and levels of debt 
 
As outlined in the SIA, taking on multiple loans was a practice commonly observed in rural and 
urban areas even before the disasters. A key finding of the analysis conducted in 2009 was that levels of 
debt were increasing. Farmers, who regularly borrowed for agricultural inputs, were particularly affected as 
the disasters hit immediately before the harvest. Small business owners in urban areas had similarly (although 
less frequently) taken out loans to purchase equipment and inventory. Loans with informal lenders had, 
therefore, been contracted in the aftermath of the typhoons to pay debts with land owners or suppliers. In 
addition, there was an overall concern that the loss of assets caused by the disasters would significantly limit 
access to credit from Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs). Across all areas visited, participants in the SIA 
indicated that informal lenders were their primary source of loans in the post-disaster period.  
 
Availability and sources of credit 
 
In spite of the concerns expressed by respondents during the SIA, the research team found that, 
overall, credit remained available.  However, a decrease in the availability of formal lending sources was 
reported in two sites of 19 areas covered by the study (Westbank Floodway, Pasig and Baliuag, Bulacan): “ 
They left after Ondoy because they were afraid of giving out loans. Before I was the one recruiting for ASA (a MFI in the 
locality). People no longer paid us so they left… TSPI (another MFI) also did not continue its operations after Ondoy. 15‖ 
Respondents in both sites indicated a parallel rise in the use of informal lenders. 
 
Sources of credit have broadly remained the same since 2009 (Figure 6). The role played by sari-sari 
stores as well as friends and family as sources of credit seems to have been less significant during the recovery 
phase. This is consistent with the idea that support from relatives is intended above all for acute emergencies. 
 
                                                          
15 Westbank Floodway, Pasig 
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There were no significant patterns observed in the availability of credit and sources of loans 
across formal and informal sites. Variations across rural and urban areas were slight (Figure 7). While 
MFIs were marginally more prevalent in urban areas, informal lenders were more frequently mentioned as 
sources of loans in rural areas. Sari-sari stores were primarily used for the purchase of food on credit in urban 
areas. Higher levels of support from neighbors in rural areas, when it comes to the pooling of resources and 
the sharing of food, may partly explain this pattern (Section 3.3 above).  
Figure 7: SIM - Sources of credit most frequently mentioned in rural and urban areas (number of sites) 
 
                                                          
16 Information used for the SIA and SIM comparison excludes data for Wawa (Taguig), which was not covered in the initial 
assessment and San Idelfonso (Bulacan), Ambassador, Tublay (Benguet) for which information on access to credit was not collected 
during the SIA. 




Households in urban areas were, however, able to draw on a wider number of Micro-Finance 
Institutions (MFIs). The most commonly found MFIs across rural and urban areas were: CARD, TSPI, 
MKBI and ASA. In addition, a large number of smaller MFIs were present in urban areas (Figure 8).  
 






Uses and conditions of loans 
 
 
While banks and MFIs primarily lend for livelihood activities (up to Php 50,000), informal 
lenders tend to provide smaller amounts (a maximum of Php 5,000) that can be used for basic 
consumption or emergency needs. The research team observed a few exceptions to this general pattern. 
Across rural sites visited, taking out personal loans from bigger land-owners, private financiers or suppliers of 
agricultural inputs was frequent. For larger loans (Php 50,000), land was usually provided as collateral. A 
similar type of loan was extended in urban areas to some small businesses where inputs and raw materials 
were purchased on credit. In both cases, there were instances reported where the creditors themselves 
purchased the farm harvests or the finished items thus significantly reducing the profit that could have been 
generated from these goods. 
 
The SIM observed no significant changes in lending terms since 2009. In 17 of the study sites, 
interest rates have remained the same for both formal and informal lending sources.17  Access to 
loans from banks and MFIs typically required a credit check and basic documentation as part of the 
application procedure. Collateral and a prior ―business history‖ is usually required by banks. While smaller 
business loans with MFIs do not always require collaterals, a screening process is used to assess whether the 
household has sufficient regular income to repay the loan. Loans are primarily extended to women based on 
the incomes earned by the male head of the household. A number of the MFIs active in the sites visited lend 
to groups of women only. In this case, the group acts as the guarantor of individual debt.  For both individual 
and group loans fines are usually charged for late payment.  While informants were very aware of the 
advantages of borrowing from MFIs, their current financial situation means that they often did not meet the 
                                                          
17 The exceptions were Palayan City, Nueva Ecija (peri-urban) and Naguilian, La Union (rural). 
Page 39 of 80 
 
requirements needed to borrow: ― It‟s difficult […] you need to attend the meetings and if you don‟t have initial savings 
you don‟t have anything. That‟s why others prefer 5/6. […]. There are better sources of financing, such as CARD, which has 
benefits.” Although are obligated and they are strict. If something happens to you: if you meet with an accident, if you die, there is 
money for you, as though you are insured, but they are also prone to scolding you.‖ (Baliuag, Bulacan). The majority of the 
MFI lending schemes include a forced savings component, where weekly loan payments are supplemented by 
small savings (usually around Php 40 or Php 50). These were frequently mentioned by respondents as one of 
the key advantages of joining an MFI: ―What I do is that I join these lending organizations so that I have savings. For 
example, I have Php 50, I will set it aside so I have something to give to the MFI and keep in my account‖18 
 
 
Respondents systematically indicated, therefore, resorting to informal lenders because of the 
easier access conditions and the ability to re-negotiate payment terms if needed. The ability to access 
funds relatively quickly offset the difficulties caused by the higher interest rates charged. Some types of 
informal loans, however, are used in emergency situations only. These are typically for small amounts of Php 
500 to Php 1,000 where extremely high interest rates are charged (Table 11). While no collateral is usually 
needed for this type of informal loans, lenders sometimes require their borrowers to purchase items from 
their commercial establishments (blankets, kettles for example), often at higher than market prices.  
Confiscating household appliances until payment is secured was an approach commonly used by informal 




























                                                          
18 Westbank Floodway, Pasig 





Source Amount Interest Conditions Payment 
frequency 
Sanctions 












Collateral required for Php 50,000 
Social connection with the lender 
The repayment of the loan amount is 
deducted from the harvest proceeds. 
The remaining profit is divided equally 
between borrower and creditor 
(individual terms can be negotiated) 
 
Interest due monthly  
After the 
harvest 
No further credit 
extended in case of 
default, instances 










The repayment of the loan amount is 
deducted when final products are sold 
 
There are instances reported where the 





No further credit 
extended in case of 
default, 





Credit check, collateral, existing 
business or employment 
 
Application includes basic 
documentation: birth certificate, 
barangay clearance form 
Monthly Fines are applied 
for late payment 
and collateral lost in 









Individual and group lending primarily 
to women 
 
Individual loans require a analysis of 
the household‘s income (where the 
male household head usually acts as the 
guarantor) 
 
Group loans also require a pre-
screening. In this case group members 
act as the guarantors for individuals in 
case of default  
 
Loans can include a forced savings 
component 
 
For larger loans applicants are required 
to shown they have an existing 
business or are employed 
 
Application includes basic 
documentation: birth certificate, 





Fines are applied 
for late payment; 
delays reduce the 
chances of being 
granted a 
subsequent loans, 
some MFIs also 
confiscate 
households items 






Php 5,000 20% 
(month) 
No application or ―screening‖ 
requirements.  
 
If the lender has a small shop the 
borrower can be required to purchase 
items (usually at 2 or 3 times the 
market value) 
 
Full loan amount is usually repaid 







can be confiscated 















Only used by informants in case of 
emergencies (and when there is 
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Levels of indebtedness and ability to pay 
 
While sources of credit continued to be available, respondents systematically reported 
increased levels of debt. While the practice of borrowing from multiple sources (“puhunan”) as a coping 
mechanism pre-dated the 2009 disasters, respondents indicated that the practice had intensified. Puhunan was 
reported in more than half of the sites visited: “Usually those who borrow do not borrow just from one source. If you 
borrow Php 2,000 from one source, Php 5,000 from the other, sometimes they all just add up and with that the problem of not 
being able to borrow…because what you earn is not enough” […] “While this has long been the practice, it is more aggressive 
today. In fact many take this option now.” (Baliuag, Bulacan). Informants reported that households typically had 
debts of between Php 10,000 and Php 20,000 at any one time from multiple sources (for small businesses and 
household expenses).  
Figure 9: Proportion of sites where risky or unsustainable borrowing practices were observed 
 
 
Reports of at least some households with unpaid debts were found across all 19 sites. 
Significant delays in making payments were noted in over half of the areas visited. Informants 
systematically reported making every possible effort to ensure debts payments were made on time. In addition 
to the penalties charged for late payment, the fear of collectors and the shame of being known within their 
communities as someone who did not pay debts, were mentioned as key reasons for trying to make timely 
payments. Some respondents could point to examples of community members who had applied for loans 
using false information: ―Some people just have their picture taken beside any store that they do not own. This is so they can 
use the photo to apply for lending.” (Dona Imelda, Quezon City). The overall perception was, however, that 
borrowing was a necessity for the majority of the households and one of the few choices available to meet 
basic needs. As discussed in Section 3.1 the few community members receiving wages were most likely to 
keep up with their debt payments. Given the very uncertain sources of income of the majority of 
respondents, households with large numbers of children or those who had to deal recently with the illness of 
a family member were considered particularly vulnerable. Unexpected medical expenses were systematically 
described as de-railing informants‘ best efforts to recover. 
The inability to repay outstanding debt led to the loss of assets in rural and urban areas.  The 
risk of losing agricultural land was particularly significant for those farmers who systematically borrowed for 
agricultural inputs. They were dependent on good harvests to be able to pay back loans and continue to farm. 
Some households have in fact not been able to recover from the debt cycle that began with the damage to 
crops caused by Ondoy and Pepeng: ―[…] My observation is that before Ondoy most of the people in the neighborhood 
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had farms and they planted sayote. But after the typhoon they lost their farms and were forced to work in another‟s farm19.‖ In 
order to make up for the losses incurred in 2009, additional personal loans were taken out with multiple 
lenders. Where harvests were bad or were damaged during the rainy season, yields were insufficient for a 
subsequent year. In some cases farmers had no choice but to put up their land as collateral for a third loan: ― 
The mindset of farmers here is, even if you are already beaten up, you have to gamble again.20 Land was often lost due to 
the inability to make payments on all outstanding loans.  
Although less prevalent, there were similar 
cases of lost assets for households engaged in small 
businesses, given the urgent need to secure capital to 
restart business activities: “The main challenge to the 
community was how to start all over again. Capital to restart the 
business was a big problem especially as the capital used for the 
former businesses was also loaned. Almost all households whose 
primary source of income is small business encountered a problem of 
how to pay their existing loans and where to get capital to start 
another business.” (Rosales, Pangasinan).  The research team 
found isolated cases where homes had been used as 
collateral for small businesses destroyed by Ondoy and 
Pepeng or where they have been sold to raise the funds 
necessary to restart a livelihood activity.21 
In nearly three-quarters of the sites visited, 
respondents indicated that they were currently 
borrowing for basic consumption needs. Across all 
sites visited, informants indicated that loans were intended 
to support livelihood activities (buying materials, stock for 
small businesses or farming inputs). The practice of 
diverting funds from businesses and income generating 
activities to cover basic consumption was, however, 
widespread in rural and urban areas:“We are fine but still very 
much in debt… our income is not enough. Of course we have to 
replace the things we lost, the rest (of the loans) for food, for my 
children‟s allowance, for school fees.” (Rosales, Pangasinan); ―For 
example, someone gets sick, the money allotted for payment of the 
debt goes to medicine.”  (Palayan, Nueva Ecija) 
In over a third of communities visited 
households were using loans to pay existing debt. 
While the research team observed this practice during the 
SIA primarily in rural areas the SIM indicated it was also 
now common in four of the urban sites as well. 
                                                          
19
 Tublay, Benguet 
20 San Idelfonso, Bulacan  
21 Bustos,Bulacan and Kasiglahan Village 1,(Rizal 
Getting into debt 
Fifty-two year old Maria ran a 
―junk-shop‖ from her home prior to the 
2009 disasters. She is married and a 
mother of three with several grand-
children. Her husband is ill and her 
children have irregular incomes. Prior to 
Ondoy, Maria put her house up as 
collateral to access a loan. The used the 
loan to do some repairs on her home and 
the rest of the capital to buy materials for 
her business.  Ondoy hit at a time when 
her shop was full of ―new‖ stock. Her 
other sources of income, pigs and rooster 
were also lost in the flood. This left her 
with no alternative means to make a living 
and with a lot of debts to pay. To make 
matters more difficult another family 
member fell ill after Ondoy, leaving her 
with hospital bills to settle: ―The truth is, 
our goods were near the river, I was […] 
hoping that they would not be carried 
away by the floodwaters because they 
were a lot of money…At the same time, 
my child was brought to the hospital.‖ At 
present, Maria works in the waste 
management program of the barangay. 
She also picks waste, something she had 
not done before: ―What am I to do, this is 
the only way to earn. Even small things 
are important to me. In fact, if there are 
pieces of wood, I collect them, tie them 
up and sell them.‖ She uses her income to 
pay debts and cover daily expenses. When 
she has no money, she buys food from 
stores on credit and pays them later. She 
couldn‘t borrow to start a business 
because she has not means to pay (walang 
pambayad). 
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Accumulated debt remained a key obstacle to recovery, significantly limiting households‘ ability to invest in 
productive activities: ―This is what happens. If you borrow money and cannot repay, you will borrow from another so you 
have money to pay. What happens is that your loans get doubled because the money you used to pay, you borrowed it from 
someone else. (Westbank Floodway, Pasig).‖ Any additional income is therefore channeled to the repayment of 
debt: “Like the time when my husband had no job, we had to borrow for our needs. The debts accumulated. Like the last time, 
we would depend on financial help from his siblings. When the money arrives, we just use it to pay our previous debts. The next 
day, we start getting into new debts again.” (Dona Imelda, Quezon City) 
3.4 Recommendations from communities 
 
One of the key findings from the discussions with communities was that livelihood support was 
often not sustainable. The availability of capital was the key ―missing element‖ in recovery, according to 
communities, and critical to enable the recovery of small businesses. Both rural and urban communities also 
stressed the importance of skills training for different sub-groups in particular in the areas of product 
development and marketing.  
Figure 10: Community recommendations on livelihood recovery (number of sites) 
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4. Social Relations and Cohesion 
4.1 Changes in intra-household relationships 
 
Gender relations 
The Social Impacts Analysis conducted in 2009 indicated that the disasters did bring about some 
significant changes in gender relations. Ondoy and Pepeng resulted in an increased work burden for 
women who took on additional or temporary jobs to supplement household income. As men, in some areas, 
began returning to their previous occupations, women were taking responsibility for carrying out or 
overseeing home repairs in addition to their existing tasks. Informants also reported, however, that 
―women‘s‖ and ―men‘s‖ tasks were performed by both genders in the aftermath of the disaster. A number of 
instances were noted where men took over domestic tasks (such as child-care responsibilities) so that women 
could earn supplementary income.  
The additional burden placed on women was thought by respondents to have decreased once 
the reconstruction activities came to an end. Some exceptions to this general pattern were noted in six22 
of the 19 sites where the qualitative research module was implemented. In these areas, informants said that 
the difficult economic conditions they experienced meant that there was a greater deal of flexibility in the 
kind of work men and women did: ―Sometimes it is the father who does the laundry […] It is the mother who oversees the 
carabaos23‖ or “If my husband has no work, then he will stay in the house and I will work”24.  The research team 
observed a perception in these sites that: ―Whatever men can do, so can the women”.25 
 
Women in all affected communities had been responsible for the management of the household 
budget, a situation that did not change with the typhoon or with recovery. Women enjoyed a great deal 
of respect and recognition within their communities for their entrepreneurial skills: ―When we do the rounds, 
selling the catch, there is a higher profit (than when the men sell it)26.‖ Managing family finances became, however, 
a more difficult task.  
The SIM further indicated that households were increasingly reliant on the income generated by 
small businesses and temporary work, primarily undertaken by women, to meet basic consumption 
needs (Section 3 above). The research team found a clear concentration of women in a more restricted 
number of occupations. These were also typically lower paid and less skilled jobs.  Women were more 
commonly drawn to home-based activities (such as piece work) that would enable them to continue 
performing domestic tasks. The highly uncertain nature of these occupations required women in affected 
areas to manage complex and very opportunistic livelihood strategies: “You‟ll have to think of how you can earn. 
Like me, I can still work. I know how to cut hair. So when I get to cut the hair of two or three people, I can already buy one kilo 
of rice, right? And then afterwards you can sell some items. You can earn more, or you can do manicure. The earnings add up.‖ 
                                                          
22 Four rural or peri-urban communities and two urban sites: Malaban (Laguna), Rosales (Pangasinan), Tublay (Benguet), Palayan 
(Nueva Ecija), La Trinidad (Benguet) and Dona Imelda (Quezon City) 
23 Palayan,Nueva Ecija 
24 Rosales, Pangasinan 
25 Tublay, Benguet 
26 Santa, Illocos Sur 
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(Palayan City, Nueva Ecija).  Unlike skilled male workers, who have relatively more secure occupations, self-
employed women are more likely to face severe time constraints to combine their income earning and 
domestic responsibilities. 
Table 12: Self-employment, predominantly male and female occupations (average earnings) 
 
 
The research team encountered isolated instances27 where the disaster response seemed to 
encourage greater engagement by women in community activities: ―They become more active so that they can 
help the community.”28  The role played by some women‘s group during disaster response (including in the 
distribution of relief assistance) seems to have resulted in a stronger engagement by women in disaster 
prevention activities.  Women‘s groups were found to be active in flood warning/prevention at community 
level and to play a significant role in community mobilization for resettlement working with local authorities. 
In addition, the livelihood activities promoted during the recovery phase and in particular the group lending 
practices followed by MFIs in 15 of the 19 research sites created additional opportunities for women to 
undertake collective activities and join community-based associations. No evidence was collected by the 
research team on whether group membership had an impact on intra-household relationships. Limited 
informant feedback indicated that important household decisions (such as whether or not to relocate) were 
primarily taken by the male household head.29 Reports of women‘s role in the 2009 disaster response and 
recovery having translated into greater decision-making power within the household were found in only one 
of the research sites.30 
                                                          
27 Tublay (Benguet) andBaliuag (Bulacan) 
28 Tublay, Benguet 
29 WestBank Floodway, Pasig City 
30 Dona Imelda, Quezon City 
Male Female 
Self-employed: skilled workers 
 
Construction (carpenters, electricians, mason and 
painters) – Php 200 to Php 500/day 
 
Jeepney  drivers  - Php 60 to Php 100/day 
Taxi drivers - Php 100 to Php 300/day 
 
 
Self-employed: unskilled workers 
Unskilled construction worker – Php 150/day 
 
Pedi-cab  driver  -Php 60 to Php 100/day  
Tricycle driver - Php 100 to Php 150/day 
 
Domestic work and laundry services - Php 200 to Php 
300/day (irregular – usually twice a week) 
 
Sari-sari stores (Php 500, gross value of daily sales) 
 
Home-based beauticians/hair-dressers (irregular income) 
 
Handicrafts/piece work  (Php 3.00 to Php 5.00 per piece – 
up to Php 50 per day/irregular) 
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New roles for youth 
The SIA noted that youth across all research sites expressed a desire to contribute further to 
recovery efforts. This emerging trend was confirmed by the SIM findings, with three key areas where 
significant changes in inter-generational relations were noted.  
First, young people contributed more to the household budget by taking on temporary work 
and in some cases by leaving school or vocational training courses to work full time. This pattern was 
observed in 13 of the 19 sites covered by the qualitative module. Although working youth had been a feature 
of community life in some rural areas prior to Ondoy and Pepeng, respondents systematically indicated an 
increase in the number of young people taking up work after the 2009 disasters.  
 






 Secondly, this seems to have been accompanied by a change in communities‟ and 
households‟ perception of young people:  “Before the male youths just hung around the neighborhood to chat and 
drink. Now, they are working. There are no more bums here.‖ 31 Young people seem to be generally more valued for 
their ability to generate additional income in the majority of the research sites: “The difference is that they are 
helping us this time because we no longer have work. […]. They carry gravel and there is somebody constructing a house.32” 
Earnings are commonly shared with parents to meet basic consumption needs, in spite of some isolated 
exceptions to this pattern: “The children‟s addiction to the internet got worse. […] Even the poorest children, instead of 
helping their parents, they use their money for internet use.”33 
This notion that young people were more trustworthy did not translate into greater voice for 
youth in decision-making at the household or at the community level. A common concern expressed 
by youth was the limited attention given to their concerns and perspectives on disaster preparedness and 
relocation at community level. In spite of what they felt was their greater awareness of environmental 
vulnerability, crucial household preparedness measures their concerns tended not to be addressed. Informants 
in some areas considered that the election period was the only exception to this general rule.34 
                                                          
31 Dona Imelda,Quezon City 
32 Tublay, Benguet 
33 Malaban,Laguna 
34 Bustos,Bulacan 
Figure 12: Types of work more frequently 
mentioned by young people (number of sites) 
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Limited changes in residence patterns 
The general trend of families staying together in the immediate aftermath of the disaster 
observed during the SIA continued during the recovery phase. Where migration had been adopted as 
a coping strategy, the household tended to move together35: ― I had one neighbor, their house was submerged in 
knee-level mud. It takes almost two months for the mud to dry up. They left for Batangas.36‖ There were, however, 
significant exceptions to this pattern. Households in resettlement sites and peri-urban areas reported more 
frequently that some family members resided close to their place of employment and came home periodically 
only. This was the case in Southville 4 (Laguna) where residents unable to afford the cost of daily commuting, 
stayed with relatives or rent rooms in Metro Manila to be able to maintain their previous jobs. A similar 
pattern was observed in Southville 5A where the research team implemented the quantitative research 
module. The findings will be presented in Section 6 below. In addition, there instances noted where children 
had been sent to live with relatives in safer locations. This was particularly true of households who consider 
their areas to remain highly vulnerable to disasters: ― I sent my two children to Binangonan because it‟s difficult here. 
Just a little rain and it floods.‖37 
 
4.2 Community cohesion during the recovery phase 
 
Mutual assistance is provided through smaller, closer-knit, social networks  
The Social Impacts Analysis conducted in 2009 had indicated that collaborative behavior was 
widespread among affected communities. Not only had respondents supported each other during 
rescue operations, but limited resources such as food or clothing had been pooled. Residents took turns 
in taking care of each others‘ children so that parents could take advantage of temporary work 
opportunities. They had also systematically contributed to the distribution of relief goods. Civil society 
and community-based organizations were mobilized, primarily in urban areas and played a critical role 
during the relief phase. Informants also reported how collaborative behavior had been extended to cover 
the initial rehabilitation of infrastructure.  
 Instances of community-level recovery activities were overall rarer. Informants systematically 
reported that after the initial efforts for the rehabilitation of infrastructure, community members 
provided support almost exclusively to their extended family and smaller social networks (including 
neighbors). These networks were important in providing information about recovery programs and 
potential livelihood activities and replaced the broader community as the main focus of collaborative 
behavior in the medium term. This trend was noted in both rural and urban areas as well as in formal and 
informal settlements: “Each to his own work.” (Nueva Ecija). 
                                                          
35 Tublay (Benguet), Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija) and Baliuag (Bulacan) 
36 Cabanatuan,Nueva Ecija 
37 Malaban, Laguna 







Where instances of community-wide support mechanisms were observed, informants 
reported they had already been strong prior to the disasters. This was primarily observed in rural 
and peri-urban areas:  ―For example if I have already fixed my house and my neighbor has not and there may be 
children at risk, some help is given.‖ 38 The research team found an isolated case where respondents 
considered that this practice of bayanihan had intensified after 2009.39 The overall perception was that 
these mutual help practices such as bayanihan or batares (community farm labor) were less frequent at the 
time of the assessment. While previously it had been possible to request for help from your neighbors to 
work in your field by providing them with their meals, ―labor is now for hire… it‟s because life in the past year 










                                                          
38 Baliuag, Bulacan 
39 Palayan, Nueva Ecija 
40 Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija 
Figure 13: Community-based recovery activities (number of 
sites) 
Figure 14: Community-based recovery activities (number of 
sites, excluding evacuation areas) 
 
Community-based organizations support recovery efforts. 
In Doña Imelda, Quezon City, a group of young people formed an organization, 
in which those who are already employed and working contributed money to a 
fund used to help those greatly affected by the typhoon. At the time of the 
assessment they were giving their collections to a church for civic activities. A 15-
year-old informant described their activities: ― They help, they work. And then they save 
to give money to those affected by the disaster. They chip in money and they give the money to the 
church‖. 
In San Fabian, the Pangasinan Community Women‘s Incorporated, supported 
recovery efforts in the area by paying for the electrical bills of the barangay 
elementary school for more than a year. The organization also provided cash 
incentives to students and supported 47 elementary and secondary student 
scholars. 
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Emerging tensions and insecurity 
Increased tensions within the community and greater levels of insecurity were observed in a 
reduced number of sites, most of them urban (Figure 15).  Overall, relationships within villages and 
urban neighborhoods remained positive.  




In communities with a significant number of new settlers there was a tendency to attribute 
law and order problems to newcomers, informal settlers or neighboring communities.  This pattern, 
identified by the research team during the SIA, continued in the post-disaster recovery phase. Social support 
networks and solidarity mechanisms existed mostly within smaller sub-groups, connected by kinship ties or 
by the fact that particular groups of households had moved into an area at the same time. The changes in 
community composition brought about by the disasters, with some informal settlers leaving danger areas and 
moving into new neighborhoods did, therefore, have some impacts on community dynamics.  This was noted 
in Kasiglahan Village 1 (KV1) (Rizal) and in Wawa (Taguig) and was often expressed in terms of a ―us‖ and 
―them‖ divide. In Wawa, residents explained the split within their community between longer-time resident 
―clans‖ and ―migrants‖. Although familiarity between the two groups developed over time according to key 
informants, the trustworthiness of migrants is considered variable.41 Some moved into the area to do 
temporary work in construction, for example, but remained ―strangers‖.  A similar pattern was noted in 
Camacho Phase II (Marikina), where petty crime is attributed to the neighboring Balubad area.  Interestingly, 
in West Bank Floodway (Pasig), residents considered that the law and order situation had improved because 
settlers on the river-bed had moved following the disasters. Informants and participants in FDGs reported a 
subsequent decrease in theft and public disturbances.  
                                                          
41 Reports from households who had moved into new areas following the disasters exemplify the difficulties sometimes 
experienced in fitting into new villages and neighborhoods. This was the case in La Trinidad (Benguet), where 
respondents who had relocated to a new area complained about their new neighbors not wanting to share their water-
supply and cutting their water hoses. 
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This pattern of sub-group allegiance can be particularly important in some communities 
where kinship ties between constituents and local authorities (barangay councilors, for example) 
plays an important role in conflict resolution. This is the case in Wawa (Taguig) where conflict issues 
among resident ―clans‖ (especially where they involve youth) are more readily resolved through mediation 
with the family.  
 Where an increase in crime and violence was noted, respondents indicated links to the difficult 
post-disaster economic situation. The group considered most at risk was youth, with informants stressing 
that the greater number of out-of-school youths or of young men without jobs had a negative impact on the 
overall sense of security42 in the community: “Most of time they hang out in the streets, creating a risk atmosphere for 
women.” In particular, respondents stressed the linkages between youth unemployment and: (i) increased drug 
use, (ii) increased gang violence, and (iii) in isolated instances of more violent crime (―hold-ups‖).43   
Informants also highlighted that the living conditions in their areas (narrow, maze-like street lay-out, lack of 
street lighting) made it more difficult for police to control crime and violence. Barangay initiatives to ensure 
better security conditions (including hiring of night watchmen) or to ―drive away drug pushers‖ and ―put 
addicts into rehabilitation‖ were also noted.44  
Beyond changes in community composition and the stress caused by the difficulties in 
earning an income in affected communities, greater insecurity was noted by groups still in 
temporary accommodation. Evacuation sites (such as Tent City in Botolan, Zambales) have now taken on 
the appearance of semi-permanent housing. While more durable roofs and partitions have been installed by 
some households, respondents in these areas highlighted their vulnerability to theft: ―Fences have been raised 
because of the drunkards outside; some have removed their tents for more space, in the past it was just a tent, now it has fences.” 
Importantly they stressed that their current living conditions put women and children at risk, with reports of 
violence noted in the resettlement site.45  
The SIA indicated that the distribution of relief assistance had led to some increase in tension 
within communities as targeting was seen in some areas as privileging some sub-groups and/or 
households with linkages to local government.  While the SIM highlighted issues with the targeting of 
recovery assistance particularly linked to the political ―instrumentalization‖ of assistance, there were no 
reports of increased conflict as a result. These issues are explored in greater detail in Section 6. 
                                                          
42 This was observed in Wawa (Taguig), KV1 (Rizal) WestBank Floodway (Pasig), Camacho Phase II (Marikina) and 
Southville 4 A (Laguna)  
43 This was noted in Wawa. Taguig City 
44 KV1, Rizal 
45 It is important to note that the SIM was not designed to assess the impact of the disaster on instances of violence 
against women within the household. While information was collected on the role of women in decision-making at 
household level, an understanding of violence against women would require a different approach and methodology 
given the sensitive nature of the topic. 
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4.3 Community recommendations to improve social cohesion 
 
Community recommendations focused on improving communication among sub-groups, LGUs, CSOs 
and POs and on promoting greater civic engagement. Suggestions came primarily from urban areas. 
 
Figure 16: Community suggestion to improve social cohesion (number of sites) 
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5. Resettlement Options and Housing Conditions 
 
In addition to the qualitative module implemented in 19 study sites, the research team sought to 
gain a better understanding of the current living conditions of households that had been resettled 
following Ondoy and Pepeng. A short survey was, therefore, implemented to provide information on the 
impacts of ―in-city‖ versus ―off-city‖ resettlement in Eusebio Bliss and Southville 5A, respectively. The 
following section begins with an overview of community perceptions of resettlement using data from the 
qualitative module. It then provides a more detailed account of the recovery trajectories of households 
resettled according to the two different approaches mentioned above. The comparison focuses primarily on 
the issues of: (i) access to livelihoods and employment, and (ii) affordability of housing46. 
 Participants‘ responses regarding resettlement and housing conditions should be understood in light 
of the status (formal/informal site) of their current place of residence, as outline in Table 13 below.  
Table 13: Security of tenure in research sites 
 
                                                          
46 Responses collected through the qualitative module from resettlement sites (as outlined in Table 13) were used to 
complement the survey data.  
 
47 This category includes sites formally established by government as well as communities with relative security of tenure 
and long-standing presence in their current location (in rural areas) 
48 Covered by the qualitative research module 
49 Covered by the qualitative research module 
Formal sites Informal or mixed 
communities 
Evacuation areas 
(temporary shelter) Resettlement sites Formal communities47 








Southville 4, Sta. Rosa City, 
Laguna 
Barangay Wawa, Taguig 
City 
Barangay Maybunga, Pasig Barangay Carael (Botolan, 
Zambales) 
 Gawad Kalinga Camacho 
Phase II, Barangay Nangka, 
Marikina City 
Barangay Caudillo, 
Cabanatuan City, Nueva 
Ecija 
Barangay Doña Imelda, 
Quezon City 
Barangay Sapang Buho, 
Palayan City, Nueva Ecija 
Barangay Puguis, La 
Trinidad, Benguet 
Barangay Poblacion, Baliuag, 
Bulacan 
Eusebio BLISS, 
Maybunga, Pasig City49 
Barangay Pulong Tamo, 
San Ildefonso, Bulacan 
Barangay Poblacion, Bustos, 
Bulacan 
Kasiglahan Village 1, 
Barangay San Jose, 
Montalban, Rizal 
Barangay Natividad, 
Naguilian, La Union 
Barangay East Carmen, 
Rosales, Pangasinan 
Barangay Longos Central, 
San Fabian, Pangasinan 
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5.2 Community views of housing and relocation assistance 
 
5.2.1 Assistance received 
 
Cash and in-kind support was available but often insufficient to cover all affected households 
Reports from participating communities on the provision of housing assistance were mixed. In-
kind and cash assistance had been provided to all significantly affected sites (Figure 17). The main sources of 
support were: (i) local government units (through emergency cash grants and in kind support); (ii) DSWD 
primarily through its Core Shelter program; and (iii) the National Housing Authority providing support for 
reconstruction activities as well as land and housing for resettlement. Civil society organizations played a 
critical role primarily in rural areas. The most frequently mentioned source of support was the Philippines 
Red Cross, which extended in-kind and cash assistance (Figure 18). 
 However, participants systematically reported that housing assistance had not been sufficient to 
address the needs of all affected households in the community.50 Segments in these communities 
consistently reported not receiving sufficient assistance for housing reconstruction:“ Here we are, still 
impoverished, our house turned upside down during the typhoon. So you can see my dilapidated house because of the absence of 
money to buy materials, instead of buying household needs we would rather buy food. So here we are making use of makeshift 
sacks just to cover the house.” 51  
Respondents highlighted delays between the initial needs assessment and the provision of 
assistance, with instances noted where the support did not arrive: ―Here people went from house to house and 
checked the damage of the house and the capacity of the owner to repair it. But they just did interviews. I saw no help coming in 
here in our place. We just thought we probably didn‟t qualify but if you look, the houses of our neighbors were totally wrecked. 
But nothing […] they took photos and then nothing. […] A year has passed and then nothing. Until it was my neighbors 
themselves who took care of the repairs, because they couldn‟t wait anymore.”52 
                        Figure 18: Main sources of assistance (number of sites) 
 
                                 
                        
                                                          
50 The only exception to this pattern was Ambassador (Tublay, Benguet) 
51 San Fabian, Pangasinan 
52 GK Camacho, Phase II, Marikina 
Figure 17: Assistance for housing reconstruction 
(number of sites) 
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               Isolated cases of households remaining in evacuation areas  
 Residents in two study sites, Botolan in Zambales and Tublay in Benguet, 53 remained in 
temporary shelter two years after they were moved from their homes. Feedback from residents 
highlighted how living conditions and access to services had deteriorated over time in these areas. This was 
the case in Tent City in Botolan, Zambales, where residents stressed unsafe and cramped living conditions 
and deteriorating sanitation. As temporary support measures were phased out, access to basic services was 
also becoming increasingly difficult. Free transportation for school children and free access to electricity for 
example had been suspended:  ―It is problematic because there are floods during school season and no vehicle goes there (to 
school).‖  Electricity, which had been “free until after elections when we were cut off,” has become costly, with 
residents now ―shar(ing) connections, extensions.” 
        Residents attributed their stalled recovery to difficulties in securing a suitable resettlement site 
and to slow progress with the needed construction work for new developments. The situation was 
particularly precarious in Botolan, where new claims had been made on portions of the resettlement site, 
causing significant delays in the process. In addition, the community observed a general lack of consultation. 
They said they had not been able to fully engage in the process that led to the selection of the site. The 
proposed resettlement site for the relocation of Tent City is on higher ground and an hour away by foot from 
the town center. Residents indicated they were not in favor of moving and would rather be resettled in lower-
lying areas for better access to basic services and livelihoods. The lack of health facilities, livelihoods, potable 
water, and electricity in the proposed resettlement area were also put forward as causes for concern:  ―You 
cannot call what is happening to us as recovery.  If you think about it, true recovery is in Barangay Carael. What has happened 
to us, this is temporary.  If Tent 1 is temporary, many of us youth, men, have helped build pumps and toilets. Here in Tent 1.  
But this is not recovery. Our recovery should be in Barangay Carael itself.” 
 
        Importantly, the research team noted that limited information on the proposed relocation 
process was available to affected households in Tublay. In particular, while community members 
expected construction work at the relocation site to be completed within a few months, local government 
indicated that construction would be completely finalized within two years.  
 
5.2.2 Reluctance to relocate 
 
The qualitative research module indicated that communities in 12 study sites were reluctant to 
resettle in areas outside their barangay.54 The main reason put forward for this unwillingness to 
move was the risk of not being able to find a suitable livelihood in the resettlement areas. This was 
true for respondents that engaged in wage work: ―My brother sends me to school and there are only the two of us. He 
works just near the barangay, If we will relocate, he will lose his job”.55 This was the sentiment as well as for those with 
                                                          
53 187 households in Botolan, Zambales and 18 households in Tublay, Benguet 
54 The analysis did not cover formal resettlement areas where the question was not applicable  
55 Dona Imelda, Quezon City 
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small businesses:  “ It is possible that in the relocation site, you will not be allowed to put up a store. It depends on the area 
too. It is ideal that your store is along the main road instead of at the back section of an area.”56 
In some sites where partial ―off-city‖ resettlement had already taken place, respondents referred to 
examples of former neighbors who had recently returned to their previous community, as they were unable to 
earn any income in the resettlement area. This pattern was observed in four of the five sites covered by the 
qualitative assessment where ―off-city‖ resettlement had taken place. This information was provided to the 
research team as an illustration of how the risk of losing one‘s livelihood was as pressing a concern as the 
safety in their current place of residence: “Even some of those of have actually relocated eventually returned to Dona 
Imelda, because they found it hard to secure employment or livelihoods in the resettlement area” […] “ […] without livelihoods 
we will still go back here. We will just die in the relocation site.57”  
Figure 19: Communities reluctant to relocate (nb of sites)              Figure 20: Concerns regarding relocation (nb of sites) 
                          
Worries about losing their current social support mechanisms were also critical.  The qualitative 
module noted the preference of residents, should they need to be moved to areas outside their barangay, to 
move together with their neighbors. This would minimize the challenge of adjusting to a new social setting 
and forming new relationships with host communities: “Moving to a new resettlement site might entail problems that 
have to do with quarrelsome neighbors” […] “ How will you be able to start a new life well when you are not used to the new 
environment?”58 
This was followed by concerns about access to services in resettlement areas. With schools and 
health centers not always available in proposed resettlement sites, respondents expressed concern that the 
cost of transport to be able to access basic services would be too high: “Many of our students had to quit school 
because they didn‟t have money for transportation.”59  The availability of water, electricity connections, adequate 
sanitation and waste disposal was also frequently mentioned.  
The perception of physical risk in their current locations and in the proposed resettlement areas 
played an important role in communities‟ unwillingness to move. On the one hand, there was an overall 
perception that some degree of flooding is part of ―normal life‖. In some instances there is an under-
estimation of the potential dangers in the current location and a degree of pride in having survived previous 
disasters: ―You were not born yet when we went through more ferocious typhoons. But here we are, still alive!‖60  This pattern 
was observed by the research team even areas that suffered heavy losses and where the risk of recurrent 
                                                          
56 Palayan City, Nueva Ecija 
57
 Dona Imelda, Quezon City 
58 Palayan City, Neuva Ecija 
59 Rosales, Pangasinan where a proportion of the affected households were relocated eight km out of town. 
60 Older male informants (Santa, Ilocos Sur) in response to social worker‘s advice that they would be safer in the 
proposed relocation site.  
Page 56 of 80 
 
flooding is high. This is the case of Little Kibungan (La Trinidad, Benguet), classified as a danger zone in 
2009. Difficulties in securing a resettlement site meant that a number of households had returned to their 
previous place of residence.61 Having adapted to recurrent disasters and respondents were, overall, more 
willing to take the risk of living with instances of flooding than to take the risk of moving to areas where 
potential sources of income are unknown or uncertain: ―[…] we are already used to life here.‖62  On the other 
hand, participants in the study highlighted that proposed resettlement sites would still be affected by the same 
risks they currently face in the areas where they reside (typhoons, flooding and landslides): “The Rodriguez 
resettlement is located along the fault line and they expect us to move there? That is why we do not concede. They will let us die 
there. They will take us out of the danger zone and move us to an earthquake zone?63 
The difficulties in identifying suitable resettlement solutions and the perception of risk 
described above meant that, in isolated cases, vulnerable households had returned to areas which 
were classified as danger zones. This was observed in Westbank Floodway (Pasig) and La Trinidad 
(Benguet). In the latter case, electricity connections had been cut temporarily (as a deterrent to households 
wishing to return to their area of origin). They were, however, restored and residents allowed to go back as 
alternative sites for relocation had not been identified. In the case of Westbank Floodway, the difficulties in 
securing a livelihood in the off-city resettlement area proposed for residents (Calauan), meant that a 
significant number of households returned to their place of origin in spite of the high risk of further flooding. 
Household aspirations and resettlement – Baliuag (Bulacan) 
A review of community perspectives regarding resettlement highlighted primarily concerns about possible 
moves and living conditions. The qualitative module did not yield a great deal of information about the perceived 
benefits of resettlement. Interviews conducted with resettled households in Baliuag, Bulacan did, however, provide 
some insights on how resettled households aspired to better family relations and a better future for their children in 
their new places of residence.64  Interviewees in the area had moved to two different sites: Starville I (a Gawad 
Kalinga site) and Starville II (supported by the Red Cross). They reported significant challenges in earning a living 
but stressed the marked improvements in living conditions and in the health of household members: ―My child does 
not get fever anymore”. “First of all, it is a very nice place and you will not hear cursing and have people drinking as in the squatter 
area.”  “There has been a very big change because you can avoid alcohol and even cigarette smoking. It‟s as i f many of these vices 
disappeared and a great change has been made.  My husband has changed.  Here his friends are more reliable, there they are into drugs.  
It was all there: vices, stealing, and I said to myself I don‟t want to raise my children in a place like that. So when this chance came, I 
said, I will not let it go”. “ I really exerted a lot of effort to move my children here. They said life was quiet here and I  have three girls 
and a boy and I saw that in our previous area, it was all gambling.  My husband thinks that here, although life is hard, it is good and 
there is no fear that my children will grow up around vices.” 
 
5.3 Impact of resettlement: “in-city” (Eusebio Bliss) and “off-city” (Southville 5A) 
                                                          
61 This under-estimation of the risk in some areas was also accompanied by a limited understanding of the impact that 
additional infrastructure can have on environmental vulnerability. Informants in Little Kibungan (La Trinidad, Benguet), 
for example, indicated their preference for ―government to clear the mountainous portion‖ of the area to minimize the 
danger of land-slides, rather than relocating. 
62 Cabanatuan, (Nueva Ecija) 
63 Dona Imelda, Quezon City 
64This is in line with the way in which National Housing Authority officials participating in the study described their role 
in the resettlement process: “To give people the option to be in a relatively, better - admittedly not yet ideal - community”. Interview 
with Arch. Luis Bacamante, Office of the Assistant General Manager, National Housing Authority, May 30, 2011 
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Move to resettlement sites resulted in overall improvements in living conditions  
 
The short surveys conducted in both resettlement sites show a clear improvement in the 
conditions of resettled households in terms of living space and quality of construction of housing 
units (Table 14). On average, a household in both survey sites has five to six members, with one-family 
households occupying most of the units in Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss (89% and 81% respectively). Only 
a small proportion of households (8%) have been relocated to smaller housing units, with the vast majority of 
residents now having bigger living spaces than before. Resettled residents in both sites now live in concrete 
homes (made of heavy materials), although units at the Eusebio Bliss are significantly better in terms of 
finishing. This is a marked improvement for both communities, in particular for Eusebio Bliss, where two-
thirds of the respondents reported that their previous houses were made of light materials.  
Table 14: Improvement in living conditions (off-city and in-city resettlement) 
 
Living 
Conditions   
Southville 5A (“off-city”) Eusebio Bliss (“in-city”) 
Prior to resettlement Resettlement area Prior to resettlement Resettlement area 
Average size of  
homes 
26.6 sq m 34 sq m 29.6 sq m 36 sq m 
Type of 
occupancy 
Not known 89% single family 
9% two families 
2% three families 
 
Average household 
size (five to six 
members) 
Not known 81% single family 
11% two families 
5% three families 
 
Average household 




43% homes built using 
concrete 
 
57% homes made of 
light materials 




68.8% homes made of 
light materials 
100% concrete home 
Access to green 
spaces 
40% 38% 56% 6% 
Access to safe 
sanitation 
94% 100% 86% 100% 
Access to 
electricity 
86% 100% 81% 100% 
Garbage 
disposal services 
100% 100% 82.5% 100% 
Access to piped 
water 
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For households relocated “in-city” (Eusebio Bliss) the improvements in living conditions 
implied, however, losing access to green spaces around their homes. While more than half of the 
households maintained small gardens in their previous place of residence, 94% reported not having 
any green areas around their homes in the resettlement site. In Southville 5A, located near a rice field and a 
row housing development, the situation was markedly different, with 38% homes retaining access to green 
spaces.   
 
Most resettled households had access to electricity, water, and garbage disposal in their 
previous place of residence, but resettlement did ensure that there was total coverage of electricity, 
garbage disposal services, and access to safe sanitation. In Southville 5A, electricity connections became 
available a month after the residents arrived from Marikina City. Before and after Ondoy and Pepeng, all 
surveyed households in Southville 5A were being serviced by the garbage collection system of the local 
government unit. The situation was similar for households in Eusebio Bliss. Before being resettled, only a 
small number of households (7.5%) were not covered by the garbage collection service.  Similarly, all resettled 
households now have access to safe sanitation (water-sealed toilets). This constitutes a moderate 
improvement from the pre-resettlement situation.  
Some challenges remain 
 
 Access to piped water constituted an exception as improvements were not noted in the 
resettlement sites. Access to piped water remained at nearly the same level for residents in Eusebio Bliss. 
For households in Southville 5A access to piped water has decreased significantly with only 13% now 
reporting access.  Water connections in the resettlement site were in fact introduced only in May 2011. 
Furthermore, households were required to pay a connection fee of PhP 4,500.00 each. Most households 
therefore continued to get water for domestic use from deep wells. The move to Southville 5A also meant 
additional expenses on drinking water. For instance, 90% of the households in Southville 5A reported buying 
bottled water, compared to 12% in their original settlement, where the main source of drinking water (77%) 
was MWSS. In addition, those residents in Southville 5A with access to piped water expressed concerns about 
its quality.65 
 
The findings from the qualitative research module provide some additional insights 
regarding overall living condition in resettlement sites. Homeowners in Baliuag (Bulacan) and Rosales 
(Pangasinan), for example, reported still needing support in accessing basic services (electricity and piped 
water connections). The issue was not always the availability of the service, but rather, households‘ ability to 
cover the costs of the new connections as well as utility bills. In Rosales, respondents clarified that electricity 
connections were the responsibility of the homeowners (i.e. not provided as part of site development) and 
that they were unable to afford access. Neighbors often shared access to electrical connection through the 
                                                          
65
 The qualitative module highlighted similar issues for the resettled community in Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan.  
Before Ondoy, community members drew water for both drinking and domestic uses from deep wells. Those in the 
resettlement site, however, had concerns about the quality of the water in the area after cases of diarrhea among children 
were observed in May 2011. The number of deep wells was also considered insufficient for the number of users.  
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―tapping‖ system (an informal ―sub-metering‖ system). Most of the households in the Rosales resettlement 
site reported using candles and gas lamps. 
 
Access to employment and higher cost of living 
 
Access to livelihood opportunities remained a challenge in all of the resettlement sites. 
Nevertheless, the adverse effects of resettlement were less visible in the “in-city” resettlement site 
(Table 15). The survey indicated that in the off-city resettlement site (Southville 5A), two out of three 
households experienced a decrease in income. In comparison, a relatively smaller but still very significant 
proportion of households experienced a similar reduction in income (49%) in Eusebio Bliss.66  
Table 15: Access to livelihoods and social support networks (off-city and in-city resettlement) 
 Southville 5A (“off-city”) Eusebio Bliss (“in-city”) 
Pre-Resettlement  Post-Resettlement Pre-Resettlement Post-Resettlement 
Households reporting 
decreased income 
- 72%  - 49%  
Changes in transport 
expenditures 
- Longer commute 
reported 
- No significant changes 
Mostly cost of housing 
(amortization) 
 Php 250   Php 1,500 to 1,900  
Households where all 
member live together 
93%  63%  90% 90% 
Households reporting 
difficulties in accessing 
support from social 
networks  
9% 35% 14% 14% 
Households approach 
LGU officials for support 
3% 9% 9% 7% 
 
The location of the resettlement site was not, however, the sole determinant of access to 
employment and livelihoods. The education level and the skill set of community members were also 
important factors. In Southville 5A, the survey indicated that more than two-thirds (69.1%) of respondents 
of working age were unskilled. Their educational attainment was also low. About one in every four completed 
high school (23.9%) and only 2% were college graduates. The more common skills possessed by community 
members were carpentry (4.8%), cooking (3.3%), and driving (2.4%). Skilled workers, particularly in 
construction reported greater ease in finding jobs Biñan or in nearby municipalities of Laguna. In general, it 
was small business owners and the self-employed in low skilled jobs (e.g. tricycle/pedicab-driving, providing 
laundry services, working as stay-out domestic helpers) who had the most difficulties adjusting to life in 
Southville 5A.  
 
                                                          
66 A relatively small proportion of residents reported an increase in income (19% of households in Eusebio Bliss and 8% 
in Southville 5A). 
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The location of the resettlement site affected not only households‟ ability to earn an income 
but also their cost of living. Increased costs of transportation to and from school for the children, to work 
and to access to health services were frequently mentioned in Southville 5A.  Most young people did in fact 
find employment as mall employees in Marikina City, which resulted in a three-hour (one way) commute 
from home to their workplaces. A similar pattern was observed through the qualitative module in all ―off-
city‖ resettlement areas. Resettled households in Rosales (Pangasinan), for example, had to travel about nine 
kilometers back to their previous place of residence to earn a living: “One problem that we have in Balingkanaway is 
the distance. It‟s farther from the town and transportation is an additional daily expense.‖   
While a similar pattern was not observed in Eusebio Bliss, significantly higher amortization 
placed a heavy burden on household finances in “in-city” resettlement. While monthly payments range 
between Php 1,500 to Php 1,900 in Eusebio Bliss, households in Southville 5A reported paying Php 250.     
 
The social cost of resettlement  
 
In addition, there were certain social costs associated with resettlement. In the surveyed study 
sites, there was a reduction in the number of households whose members stayed together after 
resettlement. This was particularly high in Southville 5A. Households reported that in the vast majority of 
cases (93%) all household members had lived together before Ondoy. However, only 63% did so after 
resettlement.  In contrast, in Eusebio Bliss, where households have been resettled in the city, there were no 
changes in household living arrangements (Table 15).  This marked difference in living arrangements between 
the two sites is mainly attributed to the fact that most resettled residents of Southville 5A kept their jobs in 
Marikina City. Working members of the family stayed with relatives or rented spaces in Marikina in order to 
be near their place of work.   
 
Resettlement has also had an impact on households‟ ability to ask for assistance from informal 
networks. Again, the impact was the strongest for households resettled “off-city” where a third of 
households in Southville 5A (35%) reported difficulties in finding assistance for their daily needs. 67  
For 19% of households relatives were the main source of support.68 In addition, a larger proportion of 
households now approached barangay officials for support although the overall number of households 
resorting to such help remained small (from 3% to 9%). In Eusebio Bliss, networks of assistance remained 
intact. The number of those who had difficulties in accessing assistance from their social networks remained 
the same before and after Ondoy (14%). Overall, relatives remained the main source of support for nearly 
half of the respondents.69 The proportion of households approaching local government units for support did 
not change significantly either: 9% and 7% before and after Ondoy, respectively.   
 
The overall perception of risk did not change significantly following resettlement, with the 
majority of households still reporting a sense of insecurity in new current place of residence. Overall 
63% of households in Southville 5A considered their current place of residence to be dangerous (compared 
                                                          
67 This is compared to 9% pre-disaster and to 14% who report being in a similar situation in Eusebio Bliss. 
68 Compared to 37% before the disaster 
69 56% before Ondoy and 55% after the disaster 
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to 65% pre-Ondoy). Similarly there was no noticeable change in the overall perception of danger in Eusebio 
Bliss (from 79% pre-Ondoy to 75% post-Ondoy). The main sources of danger mentioned in both sites did 
change after resettlement, however. Flooding was the most commonly mentioned source of danger for 
households in both areas in their previous place of residence. This was no longer the case at the time of the 
assessment. Although natural disasters were still frequently mentioned, they were now of a different sort and 
with crime and violence featuring prominently.   In Southville 5A, the most commonly mentioned risk was 
that posed by thieves, followed by typhoons, and by gang violence. The most commonly mentioned dangers 
in Eusebio Bliss were the threat of earthquakes, building stability (the capacity of their homes to withstand an 
earthquake), followed by gang violence.  
Both the SIA and the SIM‟s qualitative modules highlighted that community cohesion in some 
of the study sites was challenging for particular sub-groups or factions. Households tended to retain 
stronger bonds to others who relocated from the same areas, at the same time. Collaborative behavior across 
these groups was therefore rarer with communities being quicker to attribute negative behavior or instances 
of conflict to ‗other‖ sub-groups. The trend observed during the qualitative study was confirmed in Southville 
5A where those resettled from Marikina City pointed to households resettled to the same area from Tondo as 
the ones ―causing the troubles in the settlement‖.   
Limited access to information about resettlement options 
 
Data collected through the SIM (both from the qualitative and quantitative modules) indicated 
that information regarding resettlement was inadequate or unavailable during the relocation and 
resettlement of affected households. For most Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss respondents, their 
resettlement after Ondoy was their first change of residence (97% and 96%, respectively). In Southville 5A, 
the main reasons cited by respondents for the transfer was the loss of their houses due to the flood caused by 
Ondoy (66%) and the declaration of the previous place of residence as a danger zone and consequent 
demolition of houses (21%). A similar situation was observed in Eusebio Bliss were 69% of respondents 
moved as their previous place of residence was declared a danger zone.  
 
The SIM found a number of gaps regarding the information available to residents on the 
conditions of resettlement and cost of housing in the new sites (Table 16). In both study sites, the LGUs 
and their various offices (e.g. Marikina Settlements Office, Pasig City‘s Urban Poor Affairs Office) were the 
main providers of information. A small number of households (approximately one in ten residents in both 
Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss) reported not having been given any information at all regarding 
resettlement. Among the remainder, the research team found that a significant proportion did not have 
critical information prior to resettlement (including on the location of the resettlement site, cost of housing 
and payment schemes).  A similar trend was observed through the qualitative module, with respondents in 
Southville 4 A for example referring to their lack of understanding of the contract they entered into for the 
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Table 16: Gaps in information about the resettlement process (percentage of households) 
 
 Southville 5A (“off-
city”) 
 
Eusebio Bliss (“in-city”) 
Awareness of resettlement 
requirement and qualification 
criteria 
22% 11% 
Informed of the advantages of 
resettlement  
76% 49% 
Informed of the cost of housing 
units and payment schemes 
52% 66% 
Informed of facilities in 
resettlement sited 
31% 15% 






In spite of these critical gaps, most households considered the information conveyed helpful 
(74% of the households in Southville 5A and 86% in Eusebio Bliss). In the two study sites, information 
about the advantages of having one‘s own house was considered the most helpful advice provided (30% and 
15% in Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss, respectively). For households moving to Eusebio Bliss, information 
on the relocation site (10%) and on-site facilities (8%) were the two other most important sets of information. 
For those resettled in Southville 5A, information on the payment scheme and its accompanying rules and 
regulations (15%) and assurances that the resettlement site was free of flooding (14%) were considered the 
most useful information provided. The important role played by the LGU in providing assistance during 
resettlement was also noted by the households, the majority of which report receiving assistance from the 
LGU (69% in Southville 5A; 60% in Eusebio Bliss). However, a still significant number of those who moved 
to Southville 5A resettlement site (23%) also reported that they relied solely on the help of family members. 
 
Given the lack of information about the resettlement process, it was therefore significant that 
a large proportion of households attributed the decision to relocate primarily to the local government 
unit (35% in Southville 5A; 21% in Eusebio Bliss). The decision to move was only considered a joint 
decision between spouses in approximately a third of the cases in both sites.70 A smaller proportion of 
respondents reported that the decision to move was made by the household head (16% Southville 5A; 19% 
Eusebio Bliss).   
                                                          
70
 27% in Southville 5A and 30% in Eusebio Bliss 
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Deciding whether to stay 
 
The majority of respondents (74% in Southville 5A; 61% in Eusebio Bliss) were no longer 
planning to leave their current place of residence. This was primarily due to the opportunity of having 
their own homes in the resettlement sites.  For the remaining households, while living conditions had 
improved overall, limited access to employment (in Southville 5A) and the high cost of amortization (in 
Eusebio Bliss) meant that moving out remained an alternative. The lack of employment of opportunities was 
mentioned by over a third of households in Southville 5A (35%). To a lesser extent the still limited access to 
water and electricity (8%) and difficulties in fulfilling payment requirements for housing units (5%) were also 
reported. The situation was quite different in Eusebio Bliss where a third of the households (31%) referred to 
difficulties in making payments on their housing units and to their desire to own their own land for the main 
reason to move.  In both these areas those considering or planning to move would prefer to live close to their 
previous place of residence. 
 
Given that a significant number of residents (particularly in Eusebio Bliss) had problems 
with the housing payment scheme in place, what did residents of resettlement sites consider as the 
most suitable payment arrangements? Among those considering moving out of Southville 5A, 44% would 
prefer a longer payment period for the housing loan, 28% indicated the need for a housing grant, while 16% 
requested a lowering of interest rates on the housing loan. In Eusebio Bliss, residents indicated a preference 
for longer payment period for the housing loan (36%), a grant (32%), and a Gawad Kalinga arrangement 
(11%) where the provision of housing is accompanied by a strong social mobilization component. 
Interestingly, in spite of difficulties with making housing payments, almost all households reported preferring 
ownership to rental or lease arrangements. In Southville 5A and Eusebio Bliss, only 1% and 4%, respectively 
were considering rental arrangements.  For this small minority in Eusebio Bliss, renting was a viable 
alternative given the limited capacity to pay housing amortization fees. In Southville 5A, the travel distance to 
and from work motivated some residents to consider rental arrangements closer to their work place. 
 Table 17: Amortization conditions considered affordable (qualitative module) 
Research Site Amortization rates considered affordable 
Malaban, Binan (Laguna) Php 300 – Php 1,000 
Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija) Php 500 
Dona Imelda (Quezon City) Php 500/600 to Php 1,400 (higher income bracket); 30 year payment period 
KV1 (Rizal) Php 250 (1st to 3rd year) 
Php 500 (4th year) 
Php 825 (until payment is completed) 
Overall cost of housing unit – Php 165,000  
 
Current NHA amortization scheme was considered affordable, however, only 40 
percent of residents make regular payments 
Southville 4 A Similar amortization conditions as in KV1. Similarly few households are reported 
to make regular payments  
San Fabian (Pangasinan) Php 250 – Php 1,000; 25 year payment period 
Bustos (Bulacan) Php 500 to Php 1,000 
Sapang Buho (Nueva Ecija)  Php 400 to Php 500 
GK Camacho Phase II (Marikina) Php 200 – 500 (Current amortization rates considered affordable) 
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5.4 Community recommendations 
 
Except for the high amortization rates, communities considered that ―in-city‖ resettlement would enable 
households in need of resettlement to retain access to livelihood activities and minimize disruptions to social 
life. Where this option was not considered feasible, communities stressed the importance of providing access 
to basic services in ―off-city‖ resettlement areas, the need to ensure access to livelihoods and income 
generating activities. They further underscored the relevance of conducting environmental assessments of the 
proposed sites and to provide adequate information to households prior to resettlement.
Page 65 of 80 
 
6. Local Governance and Recovery 
6.1 Improving the delivery of recovery assistance 
 
As outlined in Section 3 above, none of communities that participated in the study agreed 
that the assistance given them had met their medium to longer term recovery needs. The respondents 
systematically indicated that relief had played a critical role in helping them cope with the immediate 
aftermath of the disasters: ―For those like me whose belongings were really damaged it was not really sufficient but […] In 
truth it was a big help as it showed you that even if it is not as big as what you lost, even if your home was washed out, you have 
something to start with. At least something to console you after what you lost.‖71 Overall, communities considered that 
both capital and appropriately designed livelihood training activities were key elements missing in disaster 
recovery, as outlined in Section 3. In addition, housing rehabilitation assistance was deemed insufficient in the 
areas visited. Delays in implementing adequate resettlement solutions meant that a significant number of 
communities remained in precarious conditions and vulnerable to further instances of flooding (Section 4). 
Receiving assistance often involved a significant waiting period for affected households: “It is a long process and 
there are a lot of requirements”72 
 Key actors: MSWDO and local leadership 
Communities systematically highlighted the role played by the Municipal Social Welfare 
Development Officer (MSWDO) in the distribution of goods and services during recovery.  The large 
number of affected households in targeted sites placed a significant burden placed on MSWDO and on the 
limited (human and financial) resources at the LGU level. MSWDOs played a number of critical roles, 
including dealing with issues of resettlement post-disaster and supporting the establishment of Homeowners 
Associations where relevant73. MSWDO often acted as intermediaries between the municipal/city 
government and international funders (sometimes even initiating the cooperation) and played a critical role in 
the targeting of assistance and in monitoring the quality of housing and support provided.     
Given this multiplicity of roles, being able to rely on community-based organizations and 
local leaders (including barangay captains, „purok‟ leaders, and heads of homeowners associations) 
during recovery was therefore essential.  Sites where respondents were satisfied with the distribution of 
recovery assistance tended to have put in place targeting systems that involved barangay and municipal city 
officers in collaboration with civil society or community-based organizations. In these cases, community-
based mechanisms were used to identify recovery needs.74 This was observed by the research team in Baliuag, 
Bulacan, where women community leaders were instrumental in surveying damage done to houses and 
identifying families who were eligible for ―in city‖ resettlement.  Their involvement extended to visiting 
families after relocation to assess the support provided.  A similar approach was reported in Botolan, 
Zambales, where staff from the MWSDO coordinated the provision of support to families in temporary 
                                                          
71 Bustos, Bulacan 
72 Doña Imelda, Quezon City 
73 This was observed in Baliuag and La Trinidad. 
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accommodation with local leaders. The latter provided critical information on the most affected households 
and their needs. Additional resources provided by national governments and/or development partners were 
therefore channeled to communities through local leadership structures. A similar approach was noted in San 
Fabian, Pangasinan, where local leaders played a critical part in targeting assistance:“ For example, when our area 
gets flooded, we will receive relief goods from the office of the mayor… we will first check who should be given, the indigents. Those 
who really need it. We screen out those who are somewhat better off.‖ 
This reliance on community targeting is, however, likely to have put less organized or 
cohesive communities at a disadvantage (as outlined in the initial SIA findings of 2009). Less well-
connected sub-groups within the affected areas, or households who did not belong to community-based 
organizations, may have been at greater risk of being left out in the distribution of assistance. Urban 
communities, where community-based organizations (CBOs) tend to rally members around specific issues, 
were more likely to have the type of CBO that can reach out to a broad spectrum of affected households, 
across sub-groups (Figure 21). It is also important to note that it was not uncommon for CBOs in research 
sites to be aligned with particular political groups at barangay and municipal level. The research team found 
isolated cases where changes at the level of the local administration had resulted in parallel changes in the 
roles played by some CBOs. This was the case for example in KV1, where CBOs aligned with the previous 
administration now have a less prominent role in health, livelihood and child-care activities, having been 
―replaced‖ in some of these functions by other organizations. 
 
Targeting of assistance  
In 9 of the 19 study sites, respondents revealed that the system put in place for the provision 
of recovery assistance had led to inequitable outcomes. Resources made available during the recovery 
phase were described as insufficient to provide support to all those affected. In these areas, there were reports 
of particular sections of the community or sub-groups being excluded. In Rosales, Pangasinan, assistance had 
primarily been given to households who relocated, with less support available for those who stayed behind: 
“Assistance was concentrated in Balingkanaway but we needed help also. All of us were affected.”  There was also a sense in 
these sites that support had been extended to undeserving households: “There were those who were not given and 
there were those who received more than once.”75 ―They choose whom they like to give to. They don‟t realize that the people they 
are helping are rich”.[…] “ Yes, there are some that got more than their allotment.” 76  
Interestingly, while respondents acknowledged that some households had been more severely 
affected than others they were reluctant to draw the conclusion that some sub-groups would therefore require 
and deserve higher levels of support to deal with their losses. Fair distribution was considered equivalent in 
some sites to providing an equal amount of support (irrespective of the damage incurred): “It would be good if 
they would treat everyone fairly. Everyone should be given because everyone suffered during the disaster.” (Cabanatuan, Nueva 
Ecija); “Those living on higher areas of the barangay did not get assistance. The thing is, whether you were affected or not, all 
should have been given assistance because everyone‟s farmland was destroyed.” (Sapang Buho, Nueva Ecija) 
                                                          
75 Baliuag, Bulacan 
76 Rosales, Pangasinan 
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The fact that the decision-making process through which resources are ultimately allocated to or 
withheld from affected households is not made known to the community is likely to contribute to this 
perception of inequitable distribution of scarce resources: “ […] Officials here go from house to house listing names 
for assistance. When the time comes for claiming the assistance, you don‟t see your name on the list. Of course, you get hurt 
because of that! They list your name but when the distribution comes, your name disappears? Those who create the list remove 
your name and put the names of their own relatives.”  (Sapang Buho, Nueva Ecija). 
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Limited access to information 
Lack of information both about the targeting process and about the existing programs and 
sources of assistance was consistently observed. Respondents considered that differences in access 
to information partly explained the uneven distribution of support: “Being ordinary citizens we do not know 
who to approach.”77 Participants reported that not everyone was informed about the recovery programs 
implemented in the community, with some respondents finding out about existing programs because they 
responded to meetings called by the barangay/organization concerned or were sought out by groups 
providing support. For others, information about recovery programs arrived too late: “Anyone could apply. The 
application is no longer available78”  
Respondents in affected areas often highlighted what they considered to be a “monopoly of 
knowledge” by community leaders. The way in which information about the support available circulated 
in affected areas seemed, therefore, to be highly reliant on personal networks with no instances reported of 
LGU putting in place outreach or communication strategies: ―There was a list, I was not yet able to have my name 
included in the list because I did not know who was making it. My neighbors told me to go to church… someone who knew where 
I lived has my name listed at the church. I was able to get pots, pans. When I was carrying these on my way home some of my 
neighbors it turned out had not been able to receive any, they were angry at us. My neighbors were very angry, asking why I got 
these and they didn‟t. When the one who made the list went to the area, they cursed the person.79 LGU staff responsible for 
the delivery of assistance, on the other hand, reported a great deal of difficulty in explaining the targeting 
process to potential beneficiaries: “I find it a big challenge, really, to be explaining to the community the conditions of the 
help offered to them, most especially if the assistance will not cover all vulnerable families and we have to select the most vulnerable 
ones; there arises conflict among the leaders and the residents.‖ 80 
                                                          
77 Doña Imelda, Quezon City 
78 Tublay Benguet 
79 Bustos, Bulacan 
80 Rosales, Pangasinan 
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Limited access to information also meant that respondents were unable to voice their 
complaints or grievances about the recovery process: “If there is a complaint, where does one go? We don‟t 
complain because there is no one to complain to.” (Malaban, Laguna) 
Personalization of assistance 
The research team found a number of instances where the provision of recovery assistance was 
highly personalized, continuing the trend observed with the provision of relief in the SIA. When 
external assistance was lacking, local leaders became the source of support.  In eight communities, there were 
instances in which a local government official (e.g. barangay captain, members of the Barangay Council, and 
the mayor), responding to the needs of his or her community, used personal funds for relief and recovery 
assistance.81  These ―out of pocket‖ forms of assistance ranged from providing a regular vehicle to bus 
children to and from the evacuation site and school, provision of temporary shelter and other cash donations 
and loans.   
The majority of gaps in the provision were not considered by the communities to be politically 
motivated. However, the research team did find some instances where the distribution of assistance 
in the recovery phase could be linked to electoral bids by local politicians:  
―One thing is that, during that time, election time is near, so there is a possibility that one who is vying for an office will say, 
„I‟ll grant you a house but you have to vote for me,‟ or „I‟ll give you a house, vote me.‟ Now, when this politician did not win, the 
house was taken back, they are giving it to another person…” 82 
“Some even ask „do you vote here?‟ Is that even fair?”83 
“Before Ondoy, upgrading of Pepay Compound was already done, in 2011 it was upgraded again. A concrete pathwalk was 
constructed in Orchids Street and Gumamela. Almost all alleys were upgraded before 2010 election. If it was not election related, 
the construction should have been done right after Ondoy”84   
 
                                                          
81 This was noted in three urban communities (Palayan City, Nueva Ecija and Maybunga, Pasig City); and five rural 
communities (La Trinidad, Benguet; Santa, Ilocos Sur; Rosales and San Fabian, Pangasinan; Botolan, Zambales). 
82 La Trinidad, Benguet 
83 Rosales, Pangasinan 
84 Wawa, Taguig 
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6.2 Disaster preparedness 
 
Greater awareness of disaster risk 
 In 12 of the study sites, recurrent flooding has resulted in a certain degree of acceptance of 
floods as part of daily life. However, the research team observed that in 17 of the 19 communities85 
visited there was a greater awareness of the dangers of flooding and of possible mitigation measures 
following Ondoy and Pepeng: “Yes. There is a difference between the typhoons now and the typhoons in the past because 
people did not expect what happened during Pepeng”86. Mass media (TV and radio) and schools (for children and 
young people) were the sources of information about disaster prevention consistently mentioned. There were 
also isolated instances where written materials provided by the municipality or the barangay were referred to 
as a useful sources of information (in two of the 19 areas covered).87 In these areas, the research team 
observed that respondents were aware of a general disaster response plan (―may sistema”). 
 In addition, increased awareness has led to a few community-based disaster prevention 
initiatives with the involvement of local governments (Figure 22). However, these covered a small 
number of sites (four of 19 covered by the SIM) and were not comprehensive or linked to wider city or 
municipal efforts. While residents in Wawa (Taguig) and Baliuag (Bulacan) were reported to be more vigilant 
about waste disposal: “They became more prepared and do not throw their trash here and there that much.”88 They did not 
also benefit from a well functioning public address system.89 
Figure 22: Improved disaster preparedness (number of sites) 
 
 
                                                          
85 In all research sites with the exception of Santa Rosa, Laguna and Cabatanuan,(Nueva Ecija 
86 Tublay, Benguet 
87 San Idelfonso, Bulacan and Doña Imelda, Quezon City 
88 Baliuag, Bulacan 
89 In place in GK Camacho Phase II, Marikina, Palayan City  and Cabanatuan City (Nueva Ecija) 
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Barangay and community level disaster preparedness measures need further strengthening 
The absence of a more comprehensive approach to Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Management (DRR/M) at community level is likely to be partly connected to the uneven progress with 
the roll-out of Municipal and Barangay Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (MDRRMC and 
BDRRMC) in the research area. These structures intended to play a coordination role of DRR/M activities 
were present or in the process of being established in 13 of the 19 study sites. Of these, 11 sites reported the 
existence of a disaster preparedness plan in their barangays. Importantly, while training on disaster 
preparedness had been implemented by LGUs and nongovernmental organizations in 15 of the study sites, 
these tended to focus on LGU officials, with limited outreach observed to the community level. 
Table 18: Overview of M/BDRRMC establishment in study sites 
Site MDRRMC BDRRMC 
Rural and peri-urban 
Tublay, Benguet - Created after Ondoy/Pepeng (2010) - Functioning;  
- Seminars and trainings held 
Baliuag, Bulacan - Created 
- Meet regularly  
- Residents unaware of structure or purpose 
but generally know of a ―plan‖ 
Bustos, Bulacan - Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng  
- Conducts orientation meetings 
- Functioning 
San Ildefonso, Bulacan - Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng - Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng 
- Lack of awareness of plan among 
community 
Naguilian, La Union - Established,  
- DRR/M plan in place according to key 
informants 
- Established,  
- DRR/M plan in place according to key 
informants 
San Fabian, Pangasinan - Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng - Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng 
Rosales, Pangasinan - Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng - None 
Botolan, Zambales - Established  
- Meets regularly during typhoon season 
- Research participant unaware of council or 
plan 
Urban 
Camacho Phase II, 
Marikina City 
- Established 
- Respondents not aware of any DRR/M 
plan; no consultation with the 
community 
- Established  
- Respondents not aware of any DRR/M 
plan; no consultation with the community 
Caudillio, Nueva Ecija - No information available - Established,  
- No DRR/M plan 
Maybunga, Pasig City - Established - Functioning and is funded 
- A community based DRM Plan exists, 
outlining responsibilities of barangay 
officials 
Doña Imelda, Quezon City - Established  
- DRR/M plan at city level but not 
known at barangay level 
-  No DRR/M plan in place 
Montalban, Rizal  - Being established at the time of the 
assessment  
- Created pre-Ondoy/Pepeng 
Wawa, Taguig City - Being established at the time of the 
assessment 
- BDRRMC exists but has not been 
formalized  
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6.3 Community recommendations 
 
 Both urban and rural communities focused on the importance of strengthening of disaster 
preparedness activities in their areas with a focus on the following: (i) acquisition of additional equipment for 
relief operations; (ii) provision of disaster preparedness trainings to include the broader community (and not 
only local officials); and (iii) establishment of a system for relief/recovery operations, considered lacking in 
the majority of sites. Apart from these common interests, urban communities emphasized the need to 
implement solid waste management activities in accordance with RA 9003. Rural communities highlighted the 
need for infrastructure rehabilitation: (i) rehabilitation of clogged tunnels and eroded mountains, and 
reconstruction of seawalls and earth-dikes, and (ii) construction or improvement of facilities (such as an 
evacuation centers) and the rehabilitation of infrastructure (roads and canals). Urban communities, which 
have been resettled or are anticipating resettlement, recommended that the political-administrative 
membership of resettled households (i.e. which barangay they belong to) be clarified before resettlement as it 
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7. Conclusions and research team recommendations 
 
7.1 Main Findings 
 
Limited long-term assistance 
Research participants primarily described “relief assistance” when asked about forms of 
support they had received.  Civil society organizations or government presence was not sustained over time 
in communities in need of assistance. Recovery projects, where they were undertaken, were tied to their 
sponsors (e.g., political leaders) rather than branded as part of a national recovery program. Communities also 
emphasized the “kanya-kanyang kayod” (self-help) aspects of recovery as well as their own personal efforts and 
were less aware of the presence of non-governmental actors that provided recovery and reconstruction 
support.  
Residents in both urban and rural study sites were unclear about which level of government 
(barangay, city/municipality, congressional district, province, or national) was responsible for 
providing recovery assistance. The SIA highlighted the importance of having close ties with local 
governments, or civil society organizations that had better access to resources. With the existence of well-
organized groups within the community, riverine communities in Metro Manila were able to cope better with 
the effects of Ondoy than lakeside communities in Laguna did. In the SIM, these linkages were only 
important in accessing resources for immediate welfare needs since communities did not actively seek long-
term assistance.  
What the residents envisioned as long-term assistance were primarily livelihood programs 
that would give them a sustainable means of earning income for themselves and their families. As 
illustrated in the detailed background reports prepared by the research team in La Trinidad, Benguet; Santa, 
Ilocos Sur, Naguilian, La Union; and Botolan, Zambales, the sustainability of livelihood skills training 








Providing livelihood skills and knowledge of the market 
 
This model of livelihood training has been successfully implemented by Rags2Riches, a for-profit organization 
known for designer bags made of rags by the women residents of Payatas, Quezon City. Rags2Riches provides 
the women with product development, marketing, sales, and community development services. It demonstrates 
how knowledge of the market and access to holders of such knowledge (e.g. fashion designers, market strategists) 
can be tapped to create and implement a business strategy (Saloma-Akpedonu, Jayme-Lao and Advincula-Lopez, 
2011). 
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Sources of credit and ability to save 
 
The SIM showed that while Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) offered relatively reasonable 
interest rates most of the need for credit was answered by private individuals and groups charging 
comparatively higher rates.  While most of the research participants reported not being able save they 
greatly valued their membership in MFIs that incorporate a ―forced savings‖ component in their payment 
schemes.  Mutual benefit associations, usually affiliates of MFIs, may have the potential to extend savings 
capacity among targeted communities by providing the poor with the option of obtaining life insurance90. 
One gap that the local governments may be able to fill was the need expressed by 
communities to be linked to formal sources of credit. Local government units could serve as guarantors 
for loans in certain sectors (e.g., agriculture) in their municipalities or cities. In some LGUs, it would be 
important to strengthen the capacity of offices providing livelihood loans (e.g., City Economic Enterprise and 
Management Office in Palayan City and Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija) and increase their ability to provide 
larger loans. A prerequisite for offering these loans, however, would be to link borrowers to institutions that 
could help put sound product development and marketing strategies in place. An equally important condition 













                                                          
90
 Interview with Ms. Silvina Antiquira, Program Manager, KASAGANA-KA-MBA, a mutual benefit assistance program 
linked with KASAGANAKA, May 31, 2011. For a premium of PhP20.00 per week, an enrolled member and four of 
his/her family members, are covered after three years of payment. In case of the member‘s death, his/her family will 
receive a death benefit in the amount of Php 100,000.00. 
Linking the poor to formal sources of credit 
 
Local government units can learn from the initiatives of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. According to Saloma-Akpedonu, Jayme-Lao, 
and Advincula-Lopez (2010):  
 
―[F]armers were oftentimes in debt, and relying on the informal lending system, more commonly known as 5-6, which carried 
exorbitant interest rates. To stem the problem, the municipality stepped in, offering 1% interest loans from its own funds in the 
amount of P10,000.00 per hectare. These loans are needed to buy fertilizers and seeds. The Municipal Agricultural Officer 
points out that the repayment rate is 100%. ―Before we give them a loan, we tell them, ‗You are being helped.  But you must 
return this help that we will give you so that we can use it again in the future.‘‖ 
 
The local government would later be successful in entering into an agreement with the local branch of the Land Bank of the 
Philippines, guaranteeing cooperative-backed loans from the bank. The payment schedule of the loan is every six months, timed 
after the harvest season. Now, farmers no longer borrow money from the local government; they now do so through the bank 
with the same repayment rate of 100%. While assisting farmers in procuring necessary resources, the loans skirted a short-term 
―dole out‖ solution that left the main stakeholders, out of the solution. In the series of intensive consultations, the mayor and 
her team also learned that debts incurred by farmers were also a result of family health emergencies. Ill-timed expenditures 
unexpectedly drained farmers‘ resources, which were now funneled towards emergency health care. Attention then turned to the 
health care sector, in particular the programs that provided health care for indigent members of the community, and how to 
turn existing programs into responsive structures for San Isidro residents who lived beyond reach of adequate healthcare. The 
first move was to make farmers members of the Philhealth ng Masa, Philhealth‘s program for its poorer members.‖ 
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Governance structures and disasters 
  
 Being distant and located in Metro Manila or in regional centers, national government agencies may 
be unfamiliar with the actual needs and practices of the local government units. In Scott‘s (1998) concept of 
state simplification, the national government (or the State), in an effort to exert more control over its various 
units and to manage them better, simplifies many complex systems rendering them easy to administer even 
from a distance. Actual practices, however, can never be assumed to always conform to the plans of the 
national government.  
 
The results of the SIM indicate that the local government unit is the focal point of action in 
the communities. This implies a wide gap between ―facts on paper and facts on the ground‖ (Scott 1998). 
There is, therefore, a need to enhance the capacities of those working on the ground (e.g., mayors, barangay 
captains, MSWDO) and to strengthen their links to information and resources provided by national 
government. Thus, while fifteen of the 19 study sites instituted community-based disaster preparedness and 
prevention programs, communities themselves were seeking technical support (e.g., substantive disaster 
preparedness training) so that they can launch in-depth preparations. Moreover, the awareness of the 
MDRMMC and BDRMMC was found to be uneven. Residents were not generally aware of the institutions 
that were or should be put in place at this level to improve disaster response.  More organized and long-term 
responses are expected from the municipal level but channeled through the barangay. Pro-active MSWDOs 
cultivated good relationships with not only the mayor and other municipal level officials (e.g., city engineers, 
planning offices, agricultural offices) but also the barangay-level officials and available NGOs and civic 
organizations in order to provide a full complement of services when the need arises.   
 
The collective experience of Ondoy and Pepeng seems to have given rise in some areas to 
new practices/ordinances that received positive response from citizens. The research team observed a 
greater awareness by the communities of the effect of some of their previous habits (waste disposal) in 
putting them at greater risk. Laguna‘s ―Bantay Lawa‖ and ―Clean Up Day‖ (Baliuag, Bulacan, and Wawa, 
Taguig) were examples of such initiatives. Other possible indicators of increased local government attention 
to disaster preparedness initiatives (particularly post-RA 10121) included training of local government 
personnel (from the municipal to the barangay level), purchase of new equipment, and increased information 
dissemination campaigns, particularly at the household level. It is, however, still unclear whether or not the 
community level DRR/M structures are functional and sustainable, as they remain mostly untested.   
The role of the MSWDO remained crucial both in day-to-day and crisis operations. This was 
further strengthened by both RA 7160 (An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991) and RA 
10121 (An Act Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System, Providing for 
the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework and Institutionalizing the National 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes). On 
one hand, the former ―transformed the DSWD from being the main, direct service provider of basic services 
to an enabler or provider of technical assistance and augmenter of funds‖ (Aldaba, 2008:3).  It also 
established a direct working relationship between the MSWDO, the Mayor and other local officials. 
According to Aldaba (2008:5): 
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―The devolution of social welfare services has been in most respects the “success story” of decentralization. The DSWD 
willingly and aggressively managed the devolution of its personnel. DSWD personnel were typically well respected by 
local executives and readily absorbed into local organizational structures. Overall in the first five years of devolution, the 
changeover process went well. Services continued to be delivered without too many difficulties.‖ 
 
The RA 10121 (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010), on the other hand, assigned to 
the MSWDO, the role of member in the MDRRMC (Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction Management 
Council). In most cases, the MDRRMC sees the MSWDO in a key implementation role, under the mayor 
who chairs the MDRRMC. Under both laws, the MSWDO plays an indispensable role in both the planning 
and delivery of necessary goods and services. Due to the devolution of the Office of the MSWDO, the 
relationship between mayor and MSWDO can be an interesting case study on how to provide assistance in 
politicized domain, particularly in areas where patronage-based bonds remain a crucial dynamic in local 
politics. Moreover, the effectiveness of the delivery of social services in the communities is very much 
dependent on the ability of the MSWDO to mobilize and manage resources. 
 
7.2 Suggested Strategies for Change  
 
Local government units and National Disaster Risk Reduction Management Council 
 
In requiring local government units to put in place a disaster risk reduction and management plan, the 
NDRRMC should provide the necessary technical assistance and monitoring system that will enable local 
government units to develop plans appropriate or responsive to local conditions and needs. The NDRRMC, 
in cooperation with the local government units, could play a significant part by: 
 
 Actively leading in the implementation of RA 10121, in particular, strengthening ongoing efforts to 
prepare or update the Comprehensive Development Plan of local government units, integrating 
disaster risk reduction and management plan into this development plan, and using the calamity fund 
to build capacity building for disaster preparedness 
 Sharing good practices in disaster preparedness such as those that evolved in Davao City and in 
Legazpi City in Albay 
 
The NDRRMC could respond to the need expressed in the communities to participate in disaster prevention 
and adaptation by: 
 
• Developing awareness of the BDRRMC and the MDRRMC particularly at the level of the barangay, 
and establishing systems to extend disaster preparedness training to the household level 
• Involving the residents and homeowners associations not only in the implementation of disaster risk 
reduction and management programs but also in barangay-level planning of such  programs for 
better ownership and sustainability 
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Local government units and the Department of Social Welfare and Development 
 
The SIA and the SIM highlighted the indispensable role of both the barangay and municipal/city governance 
units. The DSWD‘s support for the role of the local government units could be strengthened: 
 
• Improving the MSWDO‘s and LGU‘s procedures to identify vulnerable groups and their relief and 
recovery needs  
• Further build MSWDO capacity and creating further opportunities to share local experiences  
• Establishing a communication strategy to further develop financial literacy and responsible 
borrowing practices [e.g., importance of full repayment, especially of government loans such as the 
Self-Employment Assistance-Kaunlaran (SEA-K) Program] 
• Linking the poor in the communities to MFIs/MBAs which are providing credit, savings, and risk 
protection  
 
Local government units and the Department of Interior and Local Government 
 
Made aware of the direct link between flooding and the lack of a proper solid waste management, some 
communities have started to implement barangay ―clean up‖ programs. Laws that put these individual efforts 
within the wider context of solid waste management and disaster planning are in existence. The DILG and 
the local government units could help in the institutionalization of disparate community efforts by: 
 
 Monitoring the implementation of RA 9003 and RA 10121 
 
The resettlement of communities to other barangay and municipality or city also highlights the role of local 
government units in the provision of basic services and facilities. The DILG could ensure that resettlement 
would not disrupt the poor‘s access to basic services by: 
 
 Addressing medium- and long-term governance issues in communities which have been 
administratively re-defined by resettlement 
 Clarifying communities‘ entitlements in terms of service delivery so that social services will not be 
presented or perceived as  personal acts of generosity by specific officials  
 
Local government units, Department of Social Welfare and Development, and National Disaster 
Risk Reduction Management Council 
 
The SIM shows flooding and landslide are a recurrent experience in many communities. This means that 
evacuation is a constant exercise in these communities. Agencies tasked to plan for such eventualities could 
lessen the impact of staying in temporary shelters by: 
 
• Organizing physical spaces in evacuation centers to ensure safety, particularly of women and 
children: Spaces in evacuation centers where molestation and physical attacks are known to happen 
(e.g., toilets, unlit areas, grassy areas, back of buildings) must be well-constructed, well-lighted, 
guarded, or made visible to public view 
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 Making projections on the number of evacuees and allocating adequate space for each, if relocation 
and resettlement are not feasible 
 
Local government units, Technical Skills Development Authority, Department of Science and 
Technology, and Department of Trade and Industry 
 
The SIM shows that communities expect governmental response in the form of sustainable livelihood 
assistance. However, it also points out that many members of the affected communities are unskilled. 
TESDA, DOST and DTI could create a market for the products and the skills of the poor by: 
 
 Establishing partnerships between the local government units/government agencies and the private 
sector/NGOS by, on the one hand, apprising corporations, groups, and individuals of communities 
in need and, on the other, bringing knowledge of the market and technological innovation (e.g., what 
will sell to which groups, what skills are needed by which enterprise, what existing innovations could 
be introduced to products and services), 
 
Local government units, Department of Public Works and Highways, and Department of Social 
Welfare and Development 
 
The situation in rural areas and the consequent demand for infrastructure rehabilitation to mitigate and adapt 
to natural disasters highlight that certain community needs can only be addressed by the national government. 
The DPWH, DSWD, and the local government units could promote suitable responses by: 
 
 Supporting recovery efforts and assistance that are primarily large-scale infrastructure projects aimed 
at keeping communities safe: seawalls, dikes, dams, ripraps, evacuation centers, and resettlement sites 
 Making information about disaster prone provinces and areas in the country accessible to concerned 
citizens, and in the absence of existing data, conducting a technical study to determine whether in any 
affected community, relocation and resettlement should be done instead of undertaking 
infrastructure projects (e.g., seawalls, dikes, dams, ripraps) and vice versa 
 
Local government units, Department of Social Welfare and Development, and the National Housing 
Authority 
 
The results of the SIM emphasize the advantages of ―in-city‖ resettlement, even as they also underline the 
difficulties brought about by its relatively higher amortization rate; the lack of mechanisms that enables 
government planners and implementers to consider the needs of communities to be resettled; and the 
inadequacy of the existing information and communication system. The NHA, DSWD, and the local 
government units could address these gaps by continuing to: 
 
 Improve the system for apprising prospective resettlement clients of the payment scheme of housing 
units, the location and facilities available in the resettlement site, and the presence/absence of 
environmental risks in the site 
• Find ways to provide in-city resettlement options. The Maybunga Housing project of Pasig City, is 
one example of how local government units can respond to housing needs. In contrast, the 
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resettlement site in Calib-Ungan in Botolan, Zambales, which is located on a mountain some distance 
from the town center, needs further planning in the provision of electricity, water, public 
transportation, and livelihood opportunities  
• Devise ways to offer more affordable amortization schemes (e.g. partnership with the private sector 
and civil society organizations). As confirmed by the survey in Eusebio Bliss, residents in in-city 
resettlement sites have difficulties in paying the amortization of their units, as these are likely to be 
the more costly medium- and high-rise buildings 
 Consider the findings of recent studies (e.g., the Post-Disaster Community Profiling and Mapping 
Project‖ conducted by the John J. Carroll Institute on Church and Social Issues for Partnership of 
Philippine Support Services Agencies, Inc. (PhilSSA), and the ―Housing Preferences and 
Affordability Assessment‖ that UP PLANADES undertaken in Taguig for AusAID. 
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